THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE MILITARY: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR IN NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

by

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THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND

Introduction

One of the current issues in American politics today is what the military spending level should be. This controversy over the size of the defense budget has arisen largely because of the frustration over the Vietnam war. Many people have called for a change in "priorities" to meet pressing domestic problems by cutting down on defense expenditures. One key question in this debate over defense policy and spending is what role should the military play in American society today?

Civilian control of the military is one of the theories of democratic government. In the United States, the civilian governmental office holders theoretically control the military officers, who must obey their civilian superiors. This principle has been established in the Constitution of the United States. The colonists, having suffered under British rule, were determined to prevent the creation of a strong military establishment. To that end, civilian control powers were provided for in the Constitution, being divided between the executive and legislative branches. Under Article II, Section 2, the President was made, ". . . Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,. . ."[1] Congress, under Article I, Section 8, was

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[1]U. S., Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2, clause 1.

given the following powers:

> (11) To declare War, . . .;
> (12) To raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
> (13) To provide and maintain a Navy;
> (14) To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
> .....
> (18) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Power, . . .[1]

The authorization and appropriation powers were considered to be very important, for they allowed Congress to set ". . . ceilings to prevent a tyrannical executive from maintaining military forces without the consent of the people."[2]

American military officers themselves have recognized this civilian control principle. This was clearly indicated in the testimony of General Omar N. Bradley during the Army-MacArthur hearings of May, 1951. General Bradley, who at the time was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that one of the reasons why General Douglas MacArthur was relieved of his command in Korea was,

> ...that - 'they, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country.' They have always adhered to this principle and they felt that General MacArthur's actions were continuing to jeopardize the civilian control over the military authorities.[3]

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[1]U. S., Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, clauses 11-14, 18.

[2]Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII (January, 1960), 288.

[3]U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, The Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area, Hearings, before a joint committee of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Part II, pp. 878-79.

The Scope of This Study

The civilian control theory can be analyzed in many ways. The interaction between the President of the United States and the Defense Department could be examined. Another area of possible inquiry could be the relationship between the Pentagon and the State Department in the field of foreign policy. These are just two of the topics that could be explored in testing the civilian control theory. This study is limited to Congress and its relationship with the military.

More specifically, this paper will concentrate on studying legislative behavior rather than evaluating the legislative role in national security affairs (A brief history of Congress' role in military matters will be presented later in this chapter). The general purpose of this study is not to determine what should be (role) but rather what is (behavior). By studying particular roll call votes, the writer hopes to indicate how congressmen reacted to certain decisional stiuations. By investigating the voting patterns on roll call votes, it can be determined how congressmen reacted to various proposals.

This is a somewhat limited approach, since roll calls represent only a part of the legislative decision-making process. This paper will not include a study of informal activities, such as party caucuses, committee hearings, meetings of legislative leaders, and meetings between the administration and congressional officials, where controversial and important issues may be settled. However, roll call data are readily available and represent the public stands of congressmen on various political issues.

The Growth of the Military

The military in pre-World War II America: A review of the historical role of the military in American society must be considered. Today the United States has more men under arms than do either the Soviet Union or China,[1] giving it the largest armed forces in the world. But until recently this has generally not been the case. In the past, the American people had always feared a large standing army. President George Washington expressed this view in his Farewell Address on September 17, 1796, warning that, ". . . overgrown military establishments. . . are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."[2] Because of such factors as geography and weak neighboring countries, the United States maintained a large Army and Navy only during wartime. When the wars were over, expenditures for and the size of the armed forces were quickly reduced.

This trend continued up until World War II. Thus, ". . . the regular military establishment was small and enjoyed even less prestige or influence."[3] Pre-World War II officers were rarely involved in national politics. The nation's arms were produced either by government arsenals or by industry, which temporarily converted from peacetime to wartime production. During peacetime, defense spending was subjected to drastic cuts. "The highest peacetime military budgets of the

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[1]Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 37.

[2]Burton Ira Kaufman, ed., Washington's Farewell Address: The View from the 20th Century (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1969), p. 20.

[3]James A. Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., with a Foreword by David M. Shoup (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 3.

past ranged from $600 to $900 million a year under Franklin Roosevelt -- . . ."[1] Peacetime military budgets before 1939 equalled to about 1 percent of the nation's gross national product each year.[2]

The growth of the military during World War II: The coming of World War II forced the United States out of its isolationist mood of the 1930's. The armed forces (on active duty), which numbered 320,100 men (Army, Navy, and Marines) in 1939,[3] grew to 12,123,455 (Army, 8,267,958; Navy, 3,380,817; and Marines, 474,680) by 1945.[4] "Federal defense spending soared from $9 billion in 1940 to $95 billion in 1944; in mid-1943 the United States was spending at the rate of almost $8 billion a month."[5] In 1958 constant dollars this means that a defense budget of $95 billion in 1944 would be equivalent to $176.5 billion in 1972.[6]

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[1]Sidney Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970; Kansas City, Mo.: National Catholic Reporter, 1970), p. 11.

[2]Bruce M[artin] Russett, What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 2. (Hereinafter referred to as Price.)

[3]Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., p. 3.

[4]Ibid., p. 239.

[5]Ibid., p. 10.

[6]This figure was obtained by using the data given in U. S., Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Survey of Current Business: 1969 Business Statistics, supplement (17th biennial ed.; Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 2, 4. Although the amount of money listed under the category "National Defense" for 1944 is only $87.4 billion, the equations 89.0/165.4 - 87.4/x (89.0 billion = the total federal budget in 1944, $165.4 billion = the total federal budget in 1944 in constant dollars, and x = $162.4 billion) and 87.4/162.4 = 95/x were used to determine the amount in constant dollars (1958) for a $95 billion defense budget (The 1969 edition of the SCB contains the 1944 data). The government uses 1958 as the base year for all constant dollar figures.

The Cold War: After the war, the United States reverted to the prewar tradition by reducing its armed forces, and it demobilized very quickly. "By the summer of 1946 the Army had been reduced to 1.5 million men and the Navy to 700,000."[1] Defense spending was also reduced accordingly, with the defense budget reaching a low of $11.1 billion for fiscal year (FY) 1948.[2] Yet at the same time the United States chose to play an active role in world affairs. The Truman Doctrine and Kennan's containment policy[3] were designed to prevent the spread of Communism. The United States began to make military alliances during the late 1940's, signing the Rio Treaty of 1947 (Latin America) and the NATO Treaty of 1949 (Western Europe). Because of this and the Air Force's demands for more planes, defense expenditures rose to over $15 billion ($12.95 billion in appropriations) by FY 1950.[4] More importantly, the armed forces no longer remained isolated from the rest of society. Many prominent military individuals moved into the ranks of government and industry and began making important decisions. For example, in 1948 there were, ". . . some one hundred and fifty professional military men in key policy-determining posts in civilian

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[1]Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., p. 11.

[2]"The 'Military Lobby' -- Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961), 463.

[3]For a full explanation of George F. Kennan's containment policy see his book entitled American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 119, 126.

[4]Edward A. Kolodziez, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 106.

government."[1] One good illustration of this was General George Catlett Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, who served as Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949 and as Secretary of Defense from 1950 to 1951.

Defense expenditures soared during the Korean War. In appropriations alone, Congress approved $56.9 billion in FY 1952, compared with $13.3 billion in FY 1951.[2] U. S. armed forces were built up again after a period of neglect. This increase helped the U. S. meet its various defense commitments. During this era, over 13 percent of the nation's gross national product was being spent for national defense.[3]

After the Korean War, the arms race between the U. S. and Russia continued. Adopting a defensive strategy of massive retaliation, the Eisenhower Administration sought to provide U. S. armed forces with the most advanced weapons possible. Efforts were always made to keep ahead in the arms race:

> In the early '50s there was the 'bomber gap.' Fearful that the Russians would produce fleets of intercontinental bombers that would leave the U. S. exposed to attack, the nation began shelling out billions for new bomber series and an extensive air defense system. The Russians never fulfilled their bomber potential.[4]

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[1]Richard Carlton Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, eds., Roots of Political Behavior: Introduction to Government and Politics (New York: American Book Company, 1949), p. 557.

[2]"Military Critics Win Some Battles on Defense Costs," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVII (December 19, 1969), 2657.

[3]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Defense Establishment: Vested Interests and the Public Interest," in The Military-Industrial Complex and U. S. Foreign Policy, ed. by Omer L. Carey (Pullman, Wash.: Washington State University Press, 1969), p. 5.

[4]"The Military: Servant or Master of Policy?" Time, April 11, 1969, pp. 23-24.

A permanent arms industry: This increasing emphasis on technology led to a new phenomenon in American history -- a permanent arms industry. The Department of Defense (DOD), seeking new advances in aircraft, missiles, and electronics, looked to private industry to do most of the research and production. Aerospace companies like General Dynamics and Lockheed began to grow, depending almost entirely on the DOD for research funds and as the main buyer of most of their products. (Many military weapons are also sold to foreign countries.) A close relationship developed between the DOD and the defense contractors to work on defense problems. Many former high ranking officers were being hired by firms doing defense work, seeking to use their military expertise.

The rise in defense spending: Despite President Dwight D. Eisenhower's efforts, the defense budget gradually increased to more than $40 billion by FY 1960,[1] almost half of the federal budget. With an increase in American defense commitments during the 1950's, more military bases were established abroad as well as at home. Furthermore, many areas of the country were becoming economically dependent upon local defense installations and/or industries. This situation was viewed with alarm by some people. C. Wright Mills saw the country being ruled by an elite composed of, ". . . those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence; . . ."[2]

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[1]"Defense Requirements Face Severe Budget Strains," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XVIII (January 1, 1960), 11.

[2]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1956), p. 276.

In his Farewell Address to the nation on January 17, 1961, President Eisenhower put the issue into perspective with his warning about the "military-industrial complex:"

> In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
>
> We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.[1]

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, the issue of a "missile gap" was raised by the Democrats. When he assumed office, President John F. Kennedy increased defense spending, saying in his Inaugural Address that, ". . . only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed."[2] He also embarked the country on a larger role in space in a special message to Congress on May 25, 1961:

> . . ., I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. . .
> .....
>
> Let it be clear that I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action - a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs - . . .
>
> This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and technical manpower, material, and facilities, and the possibility of their diversion from other important activities where they are already thinly spread.[3]

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[1]President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "President Eisenhower's Farewell to the Nation," The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (February 6, 1961), 180-81. (Hereinafter referred to as "Farewell to Nation.")

[2]President John F. Kennedy, "The Inaugural Address of President Kennedy," The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (February 6, 1961), 176.

[3]President John F. Kennedy, "The American Freedom Doctrine," Vital Speeches & Documents of the Day (New Delhi, India), I (June 15, 1961), 399.

Therefore, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) budget (defense-related spending) was also increased. During the early 1960's, defense spending rose to over $50 billion a year.[1] Much of this additional money went to the Army to strengthen its conventional forces for "limited wars." Many people approved of these larger military budgets because of the Cold War and also partially because of the economic benefits of military expenditures.

The United States' involvement in Vietnam raised defense spending to near the $80 billion mark. The defense budget for fiscal year 1969 was $79,788,000,000, 42.9 percent of the Federal budget.[2] The strength of the armed forces (on active duty only) had increased from 2,683,752 men and women in 1965[3] to 3,477,500 in 1969.[4] Defense spending continued to play vital role in the nation's economy. On December 13, 1967, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas stated:

> As the largest producer of goods and services in the United States, the industries and businesses that fill military orders will in the coming fiscal year pour some $45 billion into over 5,000 cities and towns where over 8 million Americans, counting members of the Armed Forces, comprising approximately 10 percent of the labor force, will earn their living from defense spending.[5]

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[1]Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon: Politics, Profits, and Plunder (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), p. 368. (Hereinafter referred to as Pentagon.)

[2]Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., p. 45.

[3]Ibid., p. 239.

[4]Ibid., p. 52.

[5]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator J. William Fulbright speaking on "The War and Its Effects - II," 90th Cong., 1st sess., December 13, 1967, Congressional Record, CXIII, 36, 181.

In 1969, the number of people employed by the DOD and related agencies was 6.3 million (3.4 million military and 2.9 million civilian personnel).[1]

The growth of the Pentagon: The Pentagon has grown into an enormous institution. Pentagon officials have been given almost unlimited funds to spend for national defense. "Since the end of World War II we have spent more than one trillion dollars, or two-thirds of the total expenditures of our federal government, on armaments and armed forces."[2] Since the Korean War, between 7.3 and 11.3 percent of our gross national product has gone for national defense.[3] The Pentagon has now become, ". . . the largest single consumer organization" in the U. S.[4] The DOD has more than 6,000 military bases within the U. S.,[5] to help make it, ". . . the nation's largest landlord."[6] Furthermore, to honor the United States' defense commitments to more than forty-two

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[1]Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., p. 52.

[2]Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, eds., American Militarism 1970: A Dialogue on the Distortion of Our National Priorities and the Need to Reassert Control over the Defense Establishment (New York: Viking Press, inc., 1969), p. 11.

[3]Russett, Price, p. 2.

[4]Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., p. 44.

[5]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Stephen Young speaking on "That Powerful Military-Industrial Complex," 91st Cong., 1st sess., March 24, 1969, Congressional Record, CXV, 7177. (Hereinafter referred to as "Powerful Military-Industrial Complex.")

[6]William Proxmire, Report from Wasteland: America's Military-Industrial Complex, with a Foreword by Paul H. Douglas (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 12. (Hereinafter referred to as Wasteland.)

nations all over the world,[1] the Defense Department has stationed over 1,200,000 U. S. men overseas at 2,270 locations in 119 countries (as of August, 1969).[2]

Private industry and defense work: During the 1960's, doing defense work became a more desirable and profitable enterprise. "The industries and businesses which fill military orders have become the largest single producer of goods and services in the United States. . ."[3] Besides industries and businesses, others were avidly seeking part of this defense work, such as labor unions, universities, research organizations, communities, and politicians. In industry, "Some 22,000 prime contractors and 100,000 subcontractors enjoy the defense business that is generated in different military programs."[4] The method of distributing these contracts has tended to be a very selective process:

> In the period from 1951 through fiscal 1965, the Pentagon let contracts worth more than $357 billion. Only 13.7 percent of those contracts, covering $49 billion, were awarded through formally advertised bidding procurement procedures.[5]

Nor has this situation improved recently:

> Negotiated contracts, to a considerable extent with sole-source suppliers, have come to replace true competition. In fiscal year 1969 formally advertised competitive contract awards declined to 11 percent. The remainder

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[1]"The New Pressures to Trim U. S. Defenses," U. S. News and World Report, July 21, 1969, pp. 39-40.

[2]Donovan, Militarism, U. S. A., p. 2.

[3]Ibid., p. 44.

[4]Jack Raymond,"Growing Threat of Our Military-Industrial Complex," Harvard Business Review, XLVI (May-June, 1968), 57.

[5]Mollenhoff, Pentagon, p. 16.

were negotiated, mostly with sole-source contractors.[1] Also, ". . . some $13 billion worth of government-owned property is used by defense contractors."[2]

Many of the one hundred largest defense contractors have become very dependent on these DOD awards. These 100 companies, which received 67.4 percent of all prime military contracts awarded in 1968, generate much pressure for new weapons systems.[3] Many of them, like the aerospace companies, three-fourths of whose sales are to the government,[4] have developed close ties with the DOD and NASA. A virtual alliance has been formed between the DOD and industry, with each seeking more defense money from the government.

The situation in 1972: Although there have been some cuts in the defense budget, today the budget is still over $70 billion. According to Getler, the Defense Department also has some elaborate new weapons systems planned for the future.[5] So the defense allocation decisions of the government will probably continue to affect the entire nation, as former President Eisenhower indicated in his Farewell Address: "The

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[1]U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, Report of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Joint Committee Print, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 4.

[2]Ralph E. Lapp, Arms beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology (New York: Cowles Book Company, Inc., 1970), p. 157.

[3]Barnet, The Economy of Death, p. 101.

[4]Ralph E. Lapp, "Cutting the Defense Budget: Can the Next President Do It?" New Republic, September 28, 1968, p. 26.

[5]Michael Getler, "'On the Other Hand, Mr. President,'" Armed Forces Management, XVI (April, 1970), 25.

total influence--economic, political, even spiritual--is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the Federal Government."[1] The suggestion has even been made that without large amounts of defense spending, the nation might go into an economic depression.[2]

The Role of Congress in Military Affairs

Congressional powers: Under the Constitution Congress shares part of the responsibility of checking on the military. Congress has various methods which it can use to review and control military requests. "The two chief means of congressional control of the military are the power of the purse and the power of investigation."[3] The former, considered to be the stronger method,[4] was used very extensively by Congress before World War II to control the military:

> Prior to 1940 the executive was generally more favorably inclined toward a larger military establishment than was Congress. Congress had less immediate contact with foreign dangers and was under greater popular pressure to cut spending.[5]

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[1] Eisenhower, "Farewell to Nation," p. 180.

[2] For example, see Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace, with an Introduction by Leonard C. Lewin (New York: Dial Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 35-38, 58.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 324. (Hereinafter referred to as Soldier and State.)

[4] Bruce Martin Russett, "What the Hawks Look To," America, CXXIII (July 11, 1970), 13.

[5] Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 180.

For example, up to four or five days were sometimes spent in the House debating over the low Army budgets of the 1930's.[1] Only during wartime did Congress temporarily give up its close control over military expenses.

Congress' investigating power can also be an effective instrument in controlling and reviewing defense activities. This power was further strengthened under the following statute: "After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate."[2] Thus Congress can obtain information from other sources besides the administration.

These two congressional powers for checking the military have generally been wielded by the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees. These four committees, ". . . among the most powerful in the House and Senate,"[3] are mainly responsible for military affairs and receive the Defense Department's proposals and requests for funds. These committees help determine what the military policy and budget will be for each fiscal year.

The defense lobby: The need for advanced weapons research and production, especially after the Korean War, led to the formation of a new lobbying group. The Pentagon and the industrial contractors, seeking the production of new weapons and more military business respectively, began to exert pressure upon Congress for more and more defense spending.

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[1] Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 324-25.

[2] Act of September 7, 1962, U. S. Code, Vol. II, sec. 141(e) (1970).

[3] Proxmire, Wasteland, p. 98.

The Pentagon created its own legislative lobby to help influence congressmen. According to Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, "At the end of World War II, . . ., the military had only five legislative agents on Capitol Hill."[1] In a recent survey Senator Proxmire found that, "The Pentagon spends a minimum of $4 million a year on its 339 congressional liaison specialists, the polite term for lobbyists. This is more than one for every two of the 535 members of the House and Senate."[2] Industries, through campaign contributions and their own lobbying efforts, also generate more pressure on congressmen.

Congressmen have been especially subjected to pressure in a very sensitive area--the distribution of defense contracts and installations. For many communities, defense spending has become an important source of income. On March 24, 1969, Senator Stephen Young of Ohio said, "In many areas of the Nation a situation has been created whereby the local economy would virtually collapse if major military or so-called defense procurement were to end."[3] Major defense plants and/or military installations are now located in all fifty states and in 363 of the country's 435 congressional districts.[4] How much this situation has affected congressmen's voting on defense programs will be one topic explored in this paper.

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[1]Julius Duscha, Arms, Money, and Politics (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1965), p. 50.

[2]Proxmire, Wasteland, p. 109.

[3]Young, "Powerful Military-Industrial Complex," p. 7178.

[4]William McGaffin and Erwin Knoll, Scandal in the Pentagon: A Challenge to Democracy, Fawcett Gold Medal Book (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 96.

Previous Studies

Until very recently social scientists have done little research on the relationship between Congress and the military. The articles and books which have been written usually have offered just speculation and hypotheses which have neither been backed up nor tested by statistical data. But recently, four studies, in which particular roll call votes were analyzed, have sought to fill this void by trying to determine how much political influence the Pentagon has had on Congress.

Mitchell's dissertation: The first study was a Doctoral dissertation written by Joyce Mitchell. She analyzed the House and Senate roll call votes of the 85th (1957-58) and 87th (1961-62) Congresses which fell into one of these four general categories: (1) magnitude of defense at home, (2) magnitude of defense abroad, (3) scope of defense powers at home, and (4) scope of defense powers abroad. She attempted to test major theories of legislative behavior on national security issues by examining legislators' votes on relevent roll calls. She scored every legislator according to, ". . . the percentage of times that he voted pro-defense [for increases and against decreases in the four areas mentioned above], of the total number of times he cast a vote on national security issues."[1]

Some of her findings with respect to the House of Representatives are very interesting. She found that the Democrats tended to be more

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[1]Joyce Coward Mitchell, "Congress and National Security: An Exploration of Legislative Decision-Making" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1964), p. 234. (Hereinafter referred to as "Legislative Decision-Making.")

pro-defense than the Republicans, especially when a Democrat was president. She attributed this result to partially reflecting traditional party ideologies:

> The Democrats have repeatedly favored increased defense spending and the expansion of the government's role in defense-related scientific exploration, while the Republicans reveal a suspicion of governmental expansion, prefer economy to expenditure, and private to governmental enterprise.[1]

Thus partisanship was found to be a very decisive factor in the House:

> As in so many other policy areas, the political party is the predominant means by which aggregate positions are formed on national security policy, and this predominance of the party factor has increased from the earlier to the later period under study.[2]

With regards to the defense-related committees of the House, their members were only slightly more favorable towards national security legislation than were all House members, despite the fact that more and more of these committee members were tending to be recruited with special defense interests, such as coming from districts receiving more defense funds. Thus the voting patterns of committee members on defense measures, ". . . strongly resembled the partisan differences of the general legislative membership."[3] Even in such committees as Armed Services and Appropriations, which most directly handle domestic military programs, there was no general consensus among committee members on defense issues, but rather there was polarization and some strong opposition to defense enlargement.

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[1] Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 449.

[2] Ibid., p. 448.

[3] Ibid., p. 454.

Mitchell further determined that the defense interests of constituencies (local military bases and defense contract expenditures) was only slightly correlated with legislative voting on national security measures. Her calculations showed that there was, ". . . very little indication that constituency benefit is associated with legislators' overall pro-defense positions."[1] She concluded: "If there is a 'military-industrial complex,' it has failed in this regard, and what ever the benefits gained for particular constituencies, there has been no resultant general ideological support of increased defense measures."[2] In contrast, she found that regionalism was more closely correlated with voting patterns.

Bozik's dissertation: The most thorough and detailed study of congressional behavior on military measures was a Doctoral dissertation done by Edward Bozik. Bozik analyzed the voting patterns of both House and Senate members on military legislation from 1951 through 1966. He only investigated roll call votes on bills which fell into one of four categories: ". . . military construction authorizations, military construction appropriations, authorizations for military procurement, research, test, development and evaluation, and appropriations for the operating budget for the Department of Defense."[3]

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[1]Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 394.

[2]Ibid., p. 455.

[3]Edward Eugene Bozik, "National Defense and Congressional Behavior: Congressional Action on Authorizing and Appropriating Legislation for Military Budgets and Military Construction, 1951-1966" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 292. (Hereinafter referred to as "Congressional Action.")

Bozik used two different methods in analyzing congressional voting behavior. First, he used categorically defined issues and groups as his independent variables, determining whether they were related to the dependent variable, voting outcome. These independent variables were type of issue, political party, and geographic section. These results were then compared with those found using the second method, a Guttman scale analysis of all contested roll calls. In both methods the same data were used. He did this to determine, ". . . the degree of conformity between the investigator's categoric perceptions [the variables] and those of the legislators as evidenced by the scale analysis."[1] The results from both methods turned out to be very similar. He further analyzed his data to see whether military committee membership or the patterns of defense allocations were related to the voting behavior of the legislators.

Some of Bozik's findings are very interesting. He found that military legislation was not a very controversial issue. When controversy did arise, however, he found that party affiliation was more closely correlated with defense voting behavior than either geographic section or military committee membership: ". . ., the most reliable predictor of a representative [sic] voting behavior will be his party affiliation."[2] Also, Democrats tended to be more pro-defense than Republicans no matter which party controlled either the executive or the legislative branch. Using state and sectional data, he further concluded

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[1]Bozik, "Congressional Action," p. 18.

[2]Ibid., p. 70.

that there was no significant correlation between defense spending within a constituency and the voting behavior of the legislators.

Cobb's findings: The third study dealt with the House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st session only (1965). It was conducted by Stephen A. Cobb, a member of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Vanderbilt University. He sought to find a correlation between defense spending and voting on foreign policy issues by House members. He set up his study in this manner because he had found that almost all of the representatives had voted for the defense appropriations bills during that session. For his independent variable, he gave each congressman from the same state the same state-wide "defense involvement" and "defense dependency" scores calculated for his respective state, using the total amount of defense spending and defense-generated employment in that state.[1] He set up a "Jingoism Scale" (Guttman scaling) to measure his dependent variable (voting on foreign policy measures), wanting to rank the representatives according to their "hawkishness." The hypothesis was that the more defense money spent in a congressional district, the more belligerent a foreign policy attitude its representative would take. After doing many tests, this hypothesis was refuted. Cobb explained this finding by saying that logrolling had played a vital role in helping to get defense spending measures passed.

Cobb also used party and region as independent variables in a

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[1]Stephen A. Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy in the House of Representatives," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (September, 1969), 362-63. (Hereinafter referred to as "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy.")

multiple regression analysis and found:

> . . . that Congressmen's jingoistic voting can be explained in appreciable measure by their party affiliation and the region they represent. We interpret these variables, 'party' and 'region,' to be largely symbolic of stable, ideological predispositions.[1]

Republican and Southern representatives tended to be the most "jingoistic" of all. Cobb further found that party was the most important influence on voting behavior according to his data.

Professor Russett's study: The most recent study of congressional behavior on military matters was the one done by Bruce Russett, a Yale University political science professor. The subjects of his research were the U. S. Senators of the 87th (1961-62) and 90th (1967-68) Congresses. Like Cobb, Russett used Guttman scaling procedures when studying various roll calls. Both studies differed in many respects. Russett's lists of various defense and foreign policy roll call votes for his scales contained a wider spectrum of issues than did Cobb's list. Furthermore, Russett broke defense spending down into three components: prime contracts by state, DOD civilian payrolls by state, and DOD military payrolls by state. Also, Russett used different statistical methods than Cobb did.

Russett's conclusions are very different. He found that votes on defense expenditure bills and other defense and foreign policy issues were highly correlated with each other. Surprisingly the correlations between general defense votes and votes on NASA and gun control programs (of interest to the civilian aerospace and arms

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[1]Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy," p. 368.

manufacturing industries) were very weak. In addition, those senators who were "hawks" in the 87th Congress were still "hawks" in the 90th, and the same was true for the "doves."

As far as defense spending per state and the voting of the senators on defense legislation were concerned, the breaking down of defense spending into the three categories mentioned previously revealed some startling findings. In both Congresses, military spending for local defense bases was far more effective in influencing senators' votes on defense-related legislation than was military spending for local prime contracts:

> The industrial part [of the 'military-industrial complex'] --that is, the big manufacturing establishments--does not reinforce the hawkish or uncompromisingly anticommunist forces in this country in any strong, simple, or direct way. . . But the political effect of that spending is not the same as that of money spent to maintain a large army of many men, with bases scattered freely across the country.[1]

Thus, ". . . Department of Defense expenditures for military installations go to support and reinforce, if not to promote, a set of hawkish and strongly anticommunist postures in American political life."[2]

Russett also found that although during the 1950's Democrats were more supportive of defense measures than were Republicans,[3] the situation had changed in the 1960's:

> In the two congresses from the 1960's looked at here, only a few of the strongest doves were Republicans or southerners, and with only a single exception (and

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[1] Russett, Price, p. 85.

[2] Ibid., p. 75.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 251-59. (Hereinafter referred to as Common Defense.)

> that only in the 90th Congress) all the 20 to 25 most hawkish senators were Republicans or southern Democrats.[1]

Thus he concluded that during the 1960's Northern Democrats were generally much less hawkish than were either Republicans or Southern Democrats.

The Problem

These four investigators have attempted to determine what variables have influenced legislative behavior in national security affairs. This paper will also explore this topic by examining the relationship between the House of Representatives and the military through analysis of certain variables and various roll call votes. The House rather than the Senate was chosen because no recent studies have been done on House members in the national security legislation area, particularly since the United States' increased involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. Also the political effects may be stronger, since House members must run for re-election every two years from more homogeneous and smaller areas.[2]

The writer proposes a set of hypotheses which seem reasonable. They are presented in the next section.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses have been proposed by the writer for close examination. They have been derived using independent variables

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[1] Russett, Price, p. 86.

[2] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

from two categories: structural features and external influences. All of these variables were examined in the four studies mentioned previously, and some were found to be very important with regards to voting behavior on national security issues. The hypotheses will be analyzed through the use of particular roll call votes and other relevant data.

Structural feature hypotheses: Structural features are those characteristics within the governmental system, such as President, party, and committee, which may influence legislators' votes on national security (or any other) issues. Using committee membership and political party as the independent variables and voting outcome as the dependent variable, these particular hypotheses will be tested:

1. Committee members are more likely to vote for defense-related proposals than are non-committee members.

2. Democrats are more likely to be pro-defense than are Republicans.

External influence hypotheses: Two external influences which may be related to the voting patterns on defense issues are region and constituency economic interests in defense policies. Accordingly, these hypotheses will be tested:

1. Southerners are more likely to vote for defense-related measures than are representatives from the other sections of the country.

2. The more defense installations a congressional district has, the more "hawkish" its representative will be.

3. The more defense contracts a congressional district receives, the more likely its representative will be to vote for defense-related programs.

In addition, the technique of subclassification will be used to hold third variables constant while examining the relationship between

two other particular variables.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUBJECTS

Sources of Data

Subjects of the study: The subjects of this study were the members of the House of Representatives during the years 1961 (87th Congress, 1st session) and 1968 (90th Congress, 2nd session). These two years were chosen for two main reasons: (1) these years are separate enough to reveal any changes in attitudes toward defense issues which may have occurred within the decade and (2) in each year the same party (the Democrats) controlled both the executive and legislative branches of the government, thus avoiding additional complications that would result in the analysis.[1] Also, Russett's study included the same time periods but was on the Senate.

For both years, not all of the House members were included in this study. Because this paper depended heavily upon roll call votes, absences on roll calls were regarded as missing data (Pairs and announcements were considered the same as "yea" and "nay" responses by legislators to roll calls). The following rule was applied when investigating the voting records of the congressmen: "If a legislator fails to respond on one-half or more of the votes, he is not assigned a scale

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[1] Ibid., p. 30.

position."[1] Thus of the 437 House members in 1961,[2] 3 congressmen (Representatives Eugene Siler of Kentucky, Joe Waggonner Jr. of Louisiana and Sam Rayburn of Texas [Speaker of the House]) were eliminated from this study because they failed to respond to 50 percent or more of the roll calls selected, leaving 434 congressmen to be studied. Likewise for 1968, 430 congressmen were included in the study with 4 members (Representatives Cecil King of California, George Hansen of Idaho, John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, and John McCormack of Massachusetts [Speaker of the House]) and a vacant seat being dropped for lack of enough roll call data. Therefore this study included almost all of the House members for both years.

Roll calls - general: The roll call data, found in the annual publications of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac,[3] represent the public records of how the representatives stood on various political issues. Roll call data are very reliable because, "They do not depend for their validity as data upon verbal reports of action or upon the impressions of fallible observers."[4] Roll call votes also occur

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[1]Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 109.

[2]The membership totalled 437 in 1961 because two additional seats had temporarily been added for the representatives from the new states of Alaska and Hawaii, until later redistricting forced the number of House seats back to 435.

[3]The roll calls selected for analysis in this paper are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1961), 505-63 and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXIV (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 1H-100H.

[4]David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 12.

frequently enough on most matters to indicate the different views of the representatives.

This study was limited to analyzing the roll calls in 1961 and 1968 on national security or defense-related legislation. Unlike Bozik and Cobb, who only investigated military legislation and foreign policy votes in their respective studies, the writer broadly defined the term national security legislation to include votes on such topics as the NASA budget and the Peace Corps, as well as foreign policy and military legislation votes (The roll calls chosen will be presented in the next two sections.). Using Guttman scale analysis, the writer found that for both years all of the roll call votes included (with one exception) measured one variable, support for defense-related proposals (A brief description of Guttman scaling will be presented later in this chapter.). Furthermore, the use of many roll calls revealed distinct differences among the legislators in their support of defense-related measures.

Another reason for including a variety of issues under the defense-related legislation category was that generally military bills (military construction appropriations, military procurement appropriations, and Department of Defense appropriations) were not very controversial. In this paper a bill was considered controversial if at least 20 percent voted against the majority (This Guttman scaling procedure was followed with some exceptions, these exceptions being roll call votes which the writer felt should be included because of their particular relevance for this study.). This was probably because a vote against a bill for national defense would be considered unpatriotic and politically unwise. But while general defense bills were noncontroversial, particular parts

of these bills were subjected to debate and amendments, indicating differences among the legislators. But there were very few of these types of votes. So roll call votes on other legislation affecting the national security were also included to make the research results more statistically and politically meaningful. The writer felt that the same pressures which a constituency may put on its congressman in the domestic defense area would also be expected to influence his voting on other national security issues. Thus if the independent variables were found to be highly correlated with the voting on the roll calls used in this study, this would be similar to a defense spending-defense appropriations voting relationship.

Throughout this paper the words liberal, conservative, hawk, and dove will be used. Using the definitions of Safire, in this study the liberals or doves were those who believed, ". . . in accommodation . . . as the route to peace, . . .,"[1] while the conservatives or "war hawks" were those who were, ". . . bellicose statesmen; . . ."[2] Thus, in this study liberals were anti-defense or less supportive of defense legislation while conservatives were pro-defense or more supportive of defense measures. In the next two sections of this chapter, the writer will indicate what he felt was a liberal and a conservative vote on each roll call analyzed.

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[1]William Safire, The New Language of Politics: An Anecdotal Dictionary of Catchwords, Slogans, and Political Usage (New York: Random House, Inc., 1968), p. 120.

[2]Ibid., p. 477.

Roll calls - 1961: Before examining the roll call votes selected for 1961, a brief review of some of the year's events is necessary. This was the first year of the Kennedy Administration, and it was a year of crises. In April the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion took place, resulting in a loss in American prestige. Tension increased between East and West over Berlin, leading to President Kennedy's request to Congress for additional defense funds. In August the East Germans began building the Berlin Wall, with President Kennedy responding by sending more U. S. troops into West Berlin. The Russians added further to the crisis by resuming the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in September and October. The President then ordered the resumption of United States underground tests in September. The confrontation between East and West over Berlin eased somewhat towards the end of the year. Also, the situation in Laos continued to worsen.

The 17 roll calls included in this study for 1961[1] reflected this tense period. No real dovish pieces of legislation (in this writer's opinion) were found in this set of roll calls (see Table 1). On the most liberal vote (Congressional Quarterly [CQ] vote number 49), 41 percent of the House members cast (or announced) an anti-defense vote, which did not help differentiate the extreme doves from the moderate ones. On the other hand, the most conservative vote (CQ vote number 92) isolated the extreme hawks (depending on their other roll call votes), with 81 percent of the membership voting anti-defense

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[1]The roll call votes are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII, 505-63.

TABLE 1.--Roll Calls on National Security Legislation in the House of Representatives, 1961[a]

CQ Vote No.[b]	Vote (Yeas-Nays)	Bill
12.	269-145 (276-148)[c]	HR 5000. Amendment to the military construction authorization bill to remove the authorization of funds provided for the relocation of an Army Quartermaster Depot.
21.	329-83 (339-88)	HR 6518. Appropriation of $500 million for the Inter-American Social and Economic Cooperation Program and $100 million for the Chilean Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program.
43.	292-63 (334-69)	HR 7712. Appropriation of $47.2 million for fiscal 1961 for the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Defense, $32.2 million of which was to pay the U. S. assessment for the UN action in the Congo.
49.	173-239 (181-249)	HR 7851. Amendment to the defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1962 to delete a provision in the defense budget prohibiting price differentials in favor of economically depressed areas.
61.	241-170 (253-174)	HR 8302. Amendment to the military construction appropriation bill to eliminate funds provided for the relocation of an Army Quartermaster Depot.
75.	287-140 (293-141)	HR 8400. The 1961 foreign aid authorization.
87.	260-132 (279-153)	S 1983. Adoption of the conference report on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizing $4.2 billion in fiscal 1962 for foreign aid and $1.5 billion for development loans in each of the following four years.
88.	243-151 (262-165)	HR 9033. Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1961 increasing the military aid appropriation from $1.3 billion to $1.6 billion in fiscal 1962.
89.	270-123 (289-138)	HR 9033. Passage of the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1961.
92.	329-66 (352-69)	HR 8666. Bill to consolidate and expand U. S. educational and cultural exchange programs.

"TABLE 1.--Continued"

CQ Vote No.[b]	Vote (Yeas-Nays)	Bill
93.	212-185 (230-197)	HR 8302. Motion to disagree with a Senate amendment allowing funds for the transfer of an Army Quartermaster Depot.
99.	288-97 (313-114)	HR 7500. Passage of the Peace Corps Act.
107.	290-54 (333-68)	S 2180. Bill to establish a U. S. Arms Control Agency.
108.	253-79 (302-102)	HR 7500. Adoption of the conference report on the Peace Corps Act.
113.	253-50 (317-65)	HR 9118. Adoption of the conference report on the establishment of a U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
115.	192-81 (267-133)	HR 9033. Adoption of the conference report on the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act for fiscal 1962.
116.	152-119 (187-175)	HR 9033. Agree with a Senate amendment allowing the President to withhold foreign aid information requested by Congress if he deems it necessary.

[a]The roll calls are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVII (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1961), 505-63.

[b]CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly.

[c]The figures in parentheses represent the number of representatives for and against a bill respectively when pairs and announcements are included.

on the roll call (Unanimous and near unanimous roll call votes were omitted from this study.).

On all of the 17 roll call votes selected for 1961, a "yea" vote was considered to be a liberal response while a "nay" vote was considered to be conservative. This was based on certain assumptions. One general overall assumption was made for both years: that the liberals were internationalists, favoring government involvement and spending

abroad with a little libertarian suspicion of too big a defense effort at home, whereas the conservatives had isolationist tendencies, with some conservatives even calling for the United States to leave the United Nations. On the foreign aid roll calls (CQ vote numbers 21, 75, 87, 88, 89, and 115) it was assumed that the liberals would vote for foreign aid proposals while the conservatives would vote against them. On the Senate amendment on the withholding of foreign aid information (CQ vote number 116) it was felt that the liberals would vote to increase the President's powers in foreign affairs while the conservatives would not. Liberals would vote for the establishment of a United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a Peace Corps (CQ vote numbers 107, 113, 99, and 108), whereas conservatives would oppose these programs. Liberals, unlike conservatives, would also vote for funds for the Congo operation and United States educational and cultural exchange programs (CQ vote numbers 43 and 92). On domestic military measures it was assumed that the liberals would vote for the proposed amendments to the military construction bills to prevent the transfer of an Army Quartermaster Depot (CQ vote numbers 12, 61, and 93) to express opposition to a questionable recommendation made by the Defense Department. Finally, it was assumed that the liberals would vote for an amendment to the defense appropriations bill (CQ vote number 49) which would help "economically depressed areas."

Roll calls - 1968: In the year 1968 many important events took place. The Vietnam war continued to remain a key foreign policy issue for the United States, with U. S. troop strength in Vietnam increasing to over 500,000 men by the end of the year. In February the "Tet"

offensive occurred, during which the Vietcong attacked almost all of South Vietnam's provincial capitals. These attacks were very effective and led to the questioning of United States military progress in Vietnam. Increased opposition to the Administration's Vietnam policy helped lead to President Lyndon Johnson's announcement in March of a bombing halt over much of North Vietnam and his decision to drop out of the Presidential race to spend his full time seeking peace. The Paris peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam began in May, but very little progress was achieved during the year. Anti-war protests in the United States continued to occur throughout the year, with one of the most widely publicized demonstrations coming at the Chicago Democratic National Convention in August. In November all American bombing of North Vietnam was suspended, but the peace talks still remained stalled. In another foreign policy area relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improved somewhat during the first half of the year. But the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August led to new tensions and the postponement of the nuclear arms talks and of cuts in the number of U. S. troops stationed in Europe.

Despite the controversy over the Vietnam war, no single significant roll call vote was taken on the Vietnam issue in Congress during 1968. However, unlike 1961, the 20 roll calls selected for this study for 1968[1] included a wide range of proposals, some extremely dovish and some extremely hawkish (see Table 2). On the most liberal vote (CQ

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[1]The roll call votes are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXIV, 1H-100H.

TABLE 2.--Roll Calls on National Security Legislation in the House of Representatives, 1968[a]

CQ Vote No.[b]	Vote (Yeas-Nays)	Bill
8.	164-232 (178-245)[c]	HR 6649. Motion to recommit the Export-Import Bank extension bill with instructions to cut by $1 billion the increase in the limit on lending authority provided by the bill.
23.	241-162 (254-173)	HR 14940. Motion to recommit the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency bill with instructions to reduce a three-year, $33-million authorization to a two-year, $20 million authorization.
24.	305-96 (321-100)	HR 14940. Passage of the bill to extend the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency through June 30, 1970, and to authorize $20 million in appropriations.
29.	126-271 (133-287)	HR 15364. Motion to recommit (kill) the Inter-American Development Bank bill to provide for increased U. S. participation in the Inter-American Development Bank.
58.	262-106 (294-112)	HR 15856. Passage of the bill authorizing appropriations of $4 billion for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in fiscal 1969.
66.	269-90 (314-106)	HR 14940. Adoption of the conference report on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency bill extending the Agency's life for two years and authorizing $18.5 million for the two-year period.
102.	218-163 (240-189)	HR 16162. Amendment to the Export-Import Bank bill to limit to $100 million the amount of losses which the U. S. Treasury would be authorized to cover in excess of $100 million in losses incurred by the Export-Import Bank.
104.	180-187 (201-215)	HR 15087. Motion to recommit the Peace Corps authorization bill with instructions to reduce the authorization for fiscal 1969 appropriations from $112.8 million to $97 million.
105.	293-61 (338-70)	HR 15087. Passage of the Peace Corps authorization bill authorizing $112.8

"TABLE 2.--Continued"

CQ Vote No.[b]	Vote (Yeas-Nays)	Bill
		million for the Peace Corps in fiscal 1969.
144.	283-118 (299-119)	HR 15263. Adoption of the rule allowing three hours of debate on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 and permitting amendments.
145.	268-150 (275-157)	HR 15263. Motion to recommit the fiscal 1969 foreign aid authorization bill with instructions to cut an additional $165 million from the authorization.
146.	228-184 (238-194)	HR 15263. Passage of the fiscal 1969 foreign aid authorization bill.
162.	32-350 (37-377)	HR 18785. Motion to recommit the military construction appropriations bill for fiscal 1969.
174.	312-29 (357-31)	HR 15681. Passage of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968.
176.	73-268 (81-302)	HR 18707. Amendment to the fiscal 1969 Defense Appropriations Act prohibiting the use of funds in the bill for the purchase of aircraft or aircraft parts from overseas firms.
197.	196-151 (238-186)	HR 15263. Adoption of the conference report on the foreign aid authorization bill authorizing $2 billion in foreign economic and military aid for fiscal 1969.
198.	293-58 (326-64)	HR 19908. Adoption of the motion to consider the resolution (H Res 1308) waiving points of order against HR 19908, appropriating $1.6 billion for foreign aid in fiscal 1969.
199.	270-64 (315-69)	HR 19908. Motion to begin immediate consideration of the fiscal 1969 foreign aid appropriations bill.
200.	174-138 (234-191)	HR 19908. Passage of the foreign aid appropriations bill appropriating $1.6 billion for foreign aid in fiscal 1969.

"TABLE 2.--Continued"

CQ Vote No.[b]	Vote (Yeas-Nays)	Bill
231.	125-93 (227-183)	HR 19908. Adoption of the conference report on the fiscal 1969 foreign aid appropriations bill appropriating $1.8 billion for foreign economic and military aid in fiscal 1969.

[a]The roll calls are found in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXIV (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 1H-100H.

[b]CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly.

[c]The figures in parentheses represent the number of representatives for and against a bill respectively when pairs and announcements are included.

vote number 162), only 8 percent of the House members cast (or announced) an anti-defense vote, helping to indicate those who probably were the extreme doves (depending on their other roll call votes). On the other hand, the most conservative vote (CQ vote number 174) isolated the extreme hawks (again depending on their other roll call votes), with 83 percent of the membership voting anti-defense on the roll call (Unanimous and near unanimous roll call votes were omitted from this study.).

On 12 of the 20 roll call votes selected for 1968 a "yea" vote was considered to be a liberal response while a "nay" vote was considered conservative. On the other 8 roll calls the situation was reversed, with a "nay" response standing for liberal and "yea" for conservative.

This again was based on certain assumptions. With regards to the foreign aid roll calls, it was assumed that the liberals would vote for foreign aid (voting "yea" on CQ vote numbers 146, 197, 200, and 231 and "nay" on CQ vote number 145) while the conservatives would oppose foreign aid and vote for cuts in it. This would also apply to the procedural votes on foreign aid bills, with liberals voting for immediate consideration of foreign aid measures (voting "yea" on CQ vote numbers 144, 198, and 199) and conservatives voting for more time. On the Export-Import Bank and Inter-American Development Bank bills, it was assumed that liberals would vote against limiting the activities of these institutions (voting "nay" on CQ vote numbers 8, 29, and 102) while conservatives would vote otherwise. On the bill authorizing credit sales of U. S. military equipment abroad (CQ vote number 174) it was assumed that the liberals would vote "yea" and the conservatives "nay" on the proposal. On the "buy America" proposal (CQ vote number 176) the liberals would vote against ("nay") the bill while the conservatives would vote for it ("yea"). Liberals would also vote for more funds for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Peace Corps (voting "nay" on CQ vote numbers 23 and 104 and "yea" on CQ vote numbers 24, 66, and 105) while conservatives would vote for less money for these agencies. On domestic measures the writer assumed that the liberals would vote against ("nay") the NASA budget (CQ vote number 58) and for ("yea") a motion to recommit the military construction appropriations bill (CQ vote number 162) while the conservatives would vote otherwise.

Installation and plant data: One of the topics which will be explored in this paper will be whether constituency economic interests

in defense policies were related to the voting patterns on defense issues. Constituency economic interests were defined in this study as consisting of those economic benefits (money, jobs, and customers) in an area which were derived from defense activities. These constituency interests, which vary in amount from one House district to another, can be greatly affected by changes in national security policies. For example, a cut in the defense budget may result in the closing of some military bases. The constituency interests were measured in this study using two different classifications: the number of major military installations and the number of major private defense plants in each congressional district. These indicators were used because, unlike state figures, the data on Department of Defense expenditures by congressional district are not available, and the subcontracting patterns are classified information. Therefore, the number of major government military installations and private defense plants located in each congressional district were used as indications of how much defense money was being spent in each of the districts.[1]

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[1]The sources used to calculate the number of installations and plants located in each of the congressional districts were as follows: "The 'Military Lobby'--Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961), 472-78; Fortune 1961 Plant and Product Directory of the 500 Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations (New York: Time, Inc., 1961), Geographical Section; Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America Votes 4; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1962), pp. 1-457; Congressional Directory, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-180; "The Military-Industrial Complex: A Problem for the Secretary of Defense," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVI, special report (May 24, 1968), 1168-178; Fortune 1966 Plant and Product Directory of the 1,000 Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations (New York: Time, Inc., 1966), Geographical

This procedure took into account the differences in defense spending in the various parts of the larger states, which Cobb failed to do and therefore, ". . . washed out much of the variation in his independent variable, and thus failed to find a correlation that would otherwise have appeared."[1] Since the employment figures for each military installation and private plant (employees doing defense work only) are also not available, the installations and plants data do not give a completely accurate picture of the amount of money spent and the number of people employed by the Defense Department in each district. Thus only a few people might be stationed at one military base while thousands (including both military and civilian personnel) might be employed at another. The assumption was that the more major military

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Section; Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America Votes 8; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970), pp. 1-433; Congressional Directory, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-196; Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1971), pp. 1-91. It should be emphasized that many modifications were made in the Congressional Quarterly lists, which served as the main sources of the data, by using the congressional district boundary lines and maps found in the Congressional Directory (-ies) and Scammon and the city maps found in the Rand McNally Road Atlas. This was done to try to determine exactly in which congressional district each military installation and defense plant was located, and thus keep the data for both years relatively comparable (In the 1968 Congressional Quarterly data some bases and plants were listed several times, thus placing them in two or more congressional districts rather than just one). But because of several difficulties (such as the lack of adequate maps or addresses); some installations and plants were placed in more than one district, thus being counted more than once in the data. Also, inactive bases were not included in the data.

[1]Bruce M[artin] Russett, "Communications," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIV (June, 1970), 289.

installations and defense plants a district had ". . ., the greater visibility [of] the 'defense interest.'"[1] Despite these limitations, the data used might reveal some of the effects of defense spending on House members. Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of House

TABLE 3.--Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Military Installations, by Number and Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968[a]

Number of Installations	1961		1968	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
None	175	40.32	201	46.74
1	121	27.88	101	23.49
2	54	12.44	60	13.95
3 or more	84	19.35	68	15.82
Total	434	99.99	430	100.00

[a]Calculated from: "The 'Military Lobby'--Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961), 472-78; Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America Votes 4; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1962), pp. 1-457; Congressional Directory, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-180; "The Military-Industrial Complex: A Problem for the Secretary of Defense," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVI, special report (May 24, 1968), 1168-178; Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America Votes 8; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970), pp. 1-433; Congressional Directory, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-196; Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1971), pp. 1-91.

[1]Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 389.

constituencies, by number and percentage, among the four categories[1] for military installations and private defense plants respectively.

TABLE 4.--Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Private Defense Plants, by Number and Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968[a]

Number of Plants	1961		1968	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
None	225	51.84	204	47.44
1	95	21.89	105	24.42
2	41	9.45	47	10.93
3 or more	73	16.81	74	17.21
Total	434	99.99	430	100.00

[a]Calculated from: "The 'Military Lobby'--Its Impact on Congress, Nation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XIX (March 24, 1961), 472-78; Fortune 1961 Plant and Product Directory of the 500 Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations (New York: Time, Inc., 1961), Geographical Section; Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America Votes 4; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press for theGovernmental Affairs Institute, 1962), pp. 1-457; Congressional Directory, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-180; "The Military-Industrial Complex: A Problem for the Secretary of Defense," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXVI, special report (May 24, 1968), 1168-178; Fortune 1966 Plant and Product Directory of the 1,000 Largest U. S. Industrial Corporations (New York: Time, Inc., 1966), Geographical Section; Richard M. Scammon, comp. and ed., America Votes 8; A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly for the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1970), pp. 1-433; Congressional Directory, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-196; Rand McNally Road Atlas, United States, Canada, Mexico (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Company, 1971), pp. 1-91.

[1]Only four categories were used to prevent distortions in the other statistical figures sought in this study.

Research Procedure

All of the data gathered for this study were put on punchcards so that the calculations involved could be done by computer. One punchcard was used for each congressman, and two separate decks of punchcards were created, one deck containing the 1961 data and the other 1968 data. Besides the roll call, installation, and plant data mentioned in the previous sections, each congressman's region, political party, and committee membership were also included on each individual punchcard.

The roll call data were recorded on the punchcards in a particular manner. For each year the roll call with the lowest liberal vote (the most liberal proposal) was put in the first column of those used for recording the roll call data. The roll call with the second lowest liberal vote was put in the second column and so on, until the last column used contained the roll call with the highest liberal vote (the most conservative proposal). Thus, on each punchcard a congressman's individual voting record was recorded (0 for conservative, 1 for liberal, and 2 for not voting), indicating his votes on all of the roll calls used, from the most liberal to the most conservative.

Characteristics of the Subjects

Almost all of the congressmen for both years were included in this study. Thus the findings in this paper will apply to the entire membership of the House for both years. Due to the element of time, only certain characteristics of the congressmen were selected for analysis. The characteristics chosen were: voting records, region, political party, committee membership, and constituency economic interests.

Classification of the congressmen's voting records: In the previous sections on the roll call data the writer indicated what he felt was a liberal and a conservative vote on each roll call. But in both of the years studied, very few congressmen cast either all liberal or all conservative votes on every roll call selected for that year. So the congressmen for each year were divided into groups along a liberal-conservative scale, using their individual voting records. Each congressman was put into one of these groups or scale types according to his scale score. This scale score was a two column figure representing the number of liberal votes a congressman had cast on the roll calls for one year. Since 1's were used on the punch-cards to indicate liberal votes, the scale scores for 1961 ranged from 00 (a perfect conservative score) to 16 (a perfect liberal score).[1] Likewise, for 1968 the scale scores went from 00 (a perfect conservative score) to 20 (a perfect liberal score). In determining the scale score for each congressman, the following procedure was used in dealing with non-scale responses (absences and errors):

> All of the men casting non-scale votes can now be scored. The general rule here is that such people are scored with the group with whom they can be placed with a minimum number of alterations in their voting patterns. If the same number of alterations can place a man in either of two positions, he is placed nearest the mean score of the entire population.[2]

Thus to take a very simple example, a legislator with a voting record of 0100 (0 for conservative and 1 for liberal) would be given a scale

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[1] Congressional Quarterly vote number 12 was omitted because Guttman scaling showed that the votes on this roll call did not scale with the other roll call votes in measuring a single variable. Thus only 16 roll calls were used for 1961.

[2] George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, II (November, 1958), 397.

score of 0 and be placed in the same scale type containing legislators with a 0000 voting record (0000 representing an example of a perfect voting pattern for scaling purposes).

In Table 5 shown below, the congressmen of 1961 were placed among a scale consisting of five scale types. Those most inclined to support domestic defense measures and to oppose spending programs abroad (the conservatives) were placed in scale type 0. Going from the top to the bottom of the table, the scale scores increase (Column 3), and the scale types (Column 1) represent more liberal groups until scale type 4 is reached, consisting of the most liberal House members. The roll calls (Column 4) go from the first vote, the most conservative (CQ vote number 92), to the last one, the most liberal (CQ vote number 49). The most meaningful finding of the scale is the clustering that occurs at the extremes (Column 2). Almost 43 percent of the legislators occupy scale types 0 and 4 while only a little under 21 percent are found in the center at type 2. Thus there was much polarization in the voting on the various issues included in this set of roll calls.

In Table 6 a scale made up of six scale types was constructed to help classify the House members of 1968. Just as in Table 5, the most extreme groups of congressmen are located at the top (type 0, most conservative) and the bottom (type 5, most liberal), with the more moderate groups of legislators in the middle (Column 1). The roll calls (Column 4) again go from the most conservative (CQ vote number 174) to the most liberal (CQ vote number 162). But unlike the 1961 data, only a little less than 22 percent of the House members occupy the extremes (scale types 0 and 5) while almost 39 percent are found in the

TABLE 5.--National Security Liberal-Conservative Scale, 1961.

Scale Type[a] (1)	Number Placed in Scale Type (2)	Scale Scores (3)	CQ Vote Nos.[b] (4)
0	93	00-05	92,21,43,107,113
1	74	06-11	99,108,75,89,87,115
2	90	12	88
3	84	13-15	61,93,116
4	93	16	49
Not classified	3		
Total	437	..	..

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

[b]CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly.

middle categories (scale types 2 and 3, Column 2). This may be partially due to the existence of more extreme proposals in the set of roll call votes selected for 1968. But it is mainly because the writer deliberately chose to isolate the most extreme members of the House for testing purposes.

To show how the roll calls were assigned to different scale types, the writer has drawn a mini-scale pattern in the illustration following Table 6 (0 for conservative and 1 for liberal), using some of the roll calls from 1961. The roll call votes were assigned to scale types using the voting patterns on the roll calls. Therefore a congressman in scale type 0 in 1961 had a certain pattern of responses

TABLE 6.--National Security Liberal-Conservative Scale, 1968

Scale Type[a] (1)	Number Placed in Scale Type (2)	Scale Scores (3)	CQ Vote Nos.[b] (4)
0	58	00-03	174,105,198
1	70	04-08	24,199,66,176,144
2	71	09-13	29,8,197,146,200
3	95	14-17	231,104,102,23
4	100	18	145
5	36	19-20	58,162
Not classified	5		
Total	435	..	..

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

[b]CQ is an abbreviation for Congressional Quarterly.

92	99	88	61	49
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	0
1	1	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	1

to the roll call votes, mostly consisting of non-liberal votes.

The scales in Tables 5 and 6 will be used in various tests in the

next two chapters of this paper.

Region and party: In social science literature there have been many definitions of what states make up what regions. Such various criteria as terrain, crops or industry, climate, boundaries of political units, and past historical events have been used to define regions.[1] The writer chose to use the regional definitions of the U. S. Bureau of the Census in this study, dividing the country into four sections: Northeast, South, North Central, and West.[2] In all there are nine Northeastern, sixteen Southern, twelve North Central, and thirteen Western states.

In Table 7 shown below, the number of House seats included in each section is given, along with the proportional representation in the House for each region in both years (based on 434 seats in 1961 and 430 seats in 1968). All of the regions except the Western states were major sections in the chamber for both years, with each containing at least a fourth of the House membership (Columns 3 and 5). In both years the South represented the largest section in the House. These varying proportions must be kept in mind when examining each section's

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[1] Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 356.

[2] U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970 (91st annual ed.; Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. xii. The states which comprise these four regions are as follows: Northeast--Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; South--Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; North Central--Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; West--Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.

impact on legislative affairs.

As far as the parties were concerned, the Democrats held a majority in the House for both years. Excluding the congressmen omitted from this study,[1] there were 261 Democrats and 173 Republicans in the House in 1961, and 244 Democrats and 186 Republicans in 1968. Table 8 shows in which sections the parties were strong. The Democratic party was very strong in the South, with considerable strength also in the Northeastern and the North Central states (Columns 3 and 5). The Republican party had its greatest strength in two sections: the North Central and the Northeastern states (Columns 2 and 4). Of real significance also was the increase in the number of Republican House seats in the South from 1961 to 1968, indicating the growth of a two-party system in the South. Once again the Western states were a minor section in both parties, just as they were in proportional legislative representation.

Both region and party will be tested against other variables in the next two chapters of this paper.

Committee membership: Because congressional committees play such an important role in the legislative process, particular attention will be focused upon those congressmen who served on committees which were concerned with national security policies. More specifically, the members of the House Armed Services committee and of the Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee will be studied with special interest, since their committees deal directly

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[1] See the first section of this chapter.

TABLE 7.--Sectional Representation of House Members, by Number and Percentage, 1961 and 1968

Section	1961		1968	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Northeast	115	26.50	106	24.65
South	131	30.18	133	30.93
North Central	129	29.72	124	28.84
West	59	13.59	67	15.58
Total	434	99.99	430	100.00

TABLE 8.--Sectional Representation of House Members within Each Legislative Party, by Percentages, 1961 and 1968

Section	1961[a]		1968[b]	
	Republicans	Democrats	Republicans	Democrats
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Northeast	34.1	21.5	23.1	25.8
South	5.8	46.4	17.7	41.0
North Central	45.1	19.5	43.0	18.0
West	15.0	12.6	16.1	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

with defense-related activities and programs. Thus these congressmen constituted the category of committee members while all other representatives were considered non-committee members for the purposes of this

study.

In analyzing the composition of these three defense-related committees (one full committee and two subcommittees), some interesting findings appear. Taking the sectional representation data (Table 7, Columns 3 and 5) and comparing them with the membership of the three committees (combined), the writer found that no one region had a consistent preponderant representation on these committees in both of the years studied. (Table 9). In examining Columns 3 and 5 of Table 9, only one consistent result appears, and that is the underrepresentation of the North Central states on these committees. There may be several reasons for this. One explanation could be the absence of a traditional economic interest in national security programs, military bases, payrolls, and the like in the North Central states (More details about this situation will be presented in the next section). Another factor could be the desire of House members from the North Central states to serve on other committees with different interests, such as the Agriculture committee for example. On the other hand, the Southern and Western states may have been overrepresented on these committees because these regions had an economic interest in defense programs, with many military installations being located in coastal areas.

Constituency economic interests: In Tables 3 and 4 the installation and plant data were given, indicating the distribution of House constituencies among the four categories for each variable. In this section the data will be broken down even further to show the patterns in the distribution of these constituency economic interests according to region and committee membership.

TABLE 9.--Sectional Representation of House Members, Compared with the Membership of Defense-Related Committees,[a] by Percentages, 1961 and 1968

Section (1)	1961[b]		1968[c]	
	Sectional Representation (2)	Committee Difference (3)	Sectional Representation (4)	Committee Difference (5)
Northeast	26.50	+0.40	24.65	-1.85
South	30.18	+8.32	30.93	+0.67
North Central	29.72	-8.52	28.84	-2.54
West	13.59	-0.09	15.58	+3.72
Total	99.99	..	100.00	..

[a]The defense-related committees as defined in this study were the House Armed Services committee and the Defense Appropriations and Military Construction Appropriations subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee.

[b]There were 52 members on the 3 committees in 1961.

[c]There were 57 members on the 3 committees in 1968.

The major military installations in the United States tended to be concentrated in certain sections of the country, as shown in Table 10 below. The table indicates the clustering of major military installations in the Southern and Western states (Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9) while about half or more of the House districts in the Northeastern and North Central regions did not have any installations at all (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). This was true for both 1961 and 1968. Certain factors were probably responsible for this situation: the location of a district and the main livelihood of its population. A district situated in a remote location where farming was the main occupation tended not to

TABLE 10.--Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Military Installations, by Region, 1961 and 1968 (by Percentage of Districts)

Number of Installations	1961[a]				1968[b]			
	Region[c]				Region[c]			
(1)	NE (2)	S (3)	NC (4)	W (5)	NE (6)	S (7)	NC (8)	W (9)
None	46.1	34.4	51.2	18.6	56.6	38.3	62.1	19.4
1	25.2	28.2	33.3	20.3	20.8	27.1	24.2	19.4
2	13.9	15.3	10.9	6.8	12.3	17.3	10.5	16.4
3 or more	14.8	22.1	4.7	54.2	10.4	17.3	3.2	44.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[c]The regions are abbreviated as follows: NE for Northeast, S for South, NC for North Central, and W for West.

attract defense bases as compared to a district near the coast which contained a major urban center. These two factors may help explain why the North Central region has had a tradition of isolationism in foreign affairs in the past, and also why not as many representatives from this region served on the defense-related committees included in this study, compared with members from the other areas of the country (using sectional representation statistics).

On the other hand, the major private defense plants in the United States tended not to be as highly concentrated as the military

installations were. In Table 11 shown below, all of the regions except for the South showed approximately the same pattern in the distribution of House constituencies among the four plant classes in 1961 (Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5), with more clustering occurring in the more urban Northeastern and Western regions (especially in California). The situation had changed somewhat by 1968, with an increasing amount of defense work being done in both the South and the West (Columns 7 and 9). The Southern increase may be largely the result of having a Southerner in the White House: "Under the Johnson administration defense spending became an agent of redistribution of income in favor of some of the poorer areas of the country, especially the South, and most particularly Texas."[1] Despite this, the general patterns for the location of installations and plants were as follows: "The distribution of contracts is thus very different from that of military bases, the former. . ., tending to favor some of the industrial states and the latter especially heavy in Alaska, Hawaii, the South, and the Southwest."[2]

There was also a slight difference between committee and non-committee members in the distribution of installations and plants in their respective districts. In Table 12 shown below, the figures indicate that there tended to be a greater concentration of major military installations in the districts of committee members (Columns 3 and 5) than in those constituencies represented by non-committee members

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[1]Russett, Price, p. 69.

[2]Ibid., p. 65.

TABLE 11.--Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Private Defense Plants, by Region, 1961 and 1968 (be Percentage of Districts)

Number of Plants	1961[a]				1968[b]			
	Region[c]				Region[c]			
	NE	S	NC	W	NE	S	NC	W
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
None	38.3	73.3	45.0	45.8	40.6	55.6	52.4	32.8
1	22.6	18.3	25.6	20.3	22.6	26.3	26.6	19.4
2	13.9	4.6	11.6	6.8	16.0	8.3	11.3	7.5
3 or more	25.2	3.8	17.8	27.1	20.8	9.8	9.7	40.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[c]The regions are abbreviated as follows: NE for Northeast, S for South, NC for North Central, and W for West.

(Columns 2 and 4). This trend had grown stronger by 1968, when almost one third of the committee members had three or more major military installations in their districts (Column 5).

Major private defense plants also tended to be more heavily concentrated in the districts of committee members as opposed to those of non-committee members, although not as much as was the case for military installations. In Table 13 shown below, it can be seen that the constituencies of committee members tended to have more defense plants (proportionately) than did those of non-committee members. This relationship also had grown stronger by 1968. Thus committee members

TABLE 12.--Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Military Installations among Committee and Non-Committee Members, by Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968

Number of Installations	1961[a]		1968[b]	
	Non-Committee Members	Committee Members	Non-Committee Members	Committee Members
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
None	40.8	36.5	48.3	36.8
1	29.1	19.2	24.9	14.0
2	11.8	17.3	13.4	17.5
3 or more	18.3	26.9	13.4	31.6
Total	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9

[a]There were 52 committee and 382 non-committee members in 1961 as defined in this study.

[b]There were 57 committee and 373 non-committee members in 1968 as defined in this study.

had somewhat of a greater than proportional constituency economic interest in defense in their particular districts. Furthermore, this interest had increased from 1961 to 1968.

Statistical Measures

Before getting into more of the results of the study, a brief description of the various statistical measures used in doing the research will be presented in this section. These measures included Guttman scaling, coefficient of reproducibility, gamma correlation, and Pearson's contingency coefficient (C).

Guttman scaling and coefficient of reproducibility: Guttman scaling, which has been referred to previously in this paper, is an

TABLE 13.--Distribution of House Constituencies of Numbers of Private Defense Plants among Committee and Non-Committee Members, by Percentage of Districts, 1961 and 1968

Number of Plants (1)	1961[a]		1968[b]	
	Non-Committee Members (2)	Committee Members (3)	Non-Committee Members (4)	Committee Members (5)
None	52.6	46.2	49.1	36.8
1	21.5	25.0	23.9	28.1
2	9.4	9.6	10.2	15.8
3 or more	16.5	19.2	16.9	19.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0

[a]There were 52 committee and 382 non-committee members in 1961 as defined in this study.

[b]There were 57 committee and 373 non-committee members in 1968 as defined in this study.

attempt to study individual attitudes. A Guttman scale is,

> . . . a procedure (1) for ordering cases in terms of a property conceived as unidimensional, which (2) combines multiple indicants (or items) into a composite measure, and which at the same time (3) tests the assumption that these indicants do 'hang together' to represent a single dimension (or unitary concept).[1]

In this study the voting patterns on two sets of roll calls (Tables 1 and 2) were examined to determine whether both sets were scalar (measured one variable only). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 16 out of the 17 roll calls for the first set (1961) formed a scalar pattern (CQ vote

[1]Matilda White Riley, Sociological Research I: A Case Approach (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1963), p. 470.

number 12 did not) while all 20 roll calls in the second group (1968) measured a single variable. Thus two Guttman scales were created, one for each year, measuring one common variable--support for defense-related legislation (see Tables 5 and 6). Then the congressmen for each year were placed along the respective scales according to their individual scale scores, resulting in the distributions shown in Tables 5 and 6.

The coefficients of reproducibility (which are measures of deviation from a perfect scale) obtained for the two scales were: 0.91 for 1961 (using 16 roll calls) and 0.93 for 1968.[1] Conventionally, a reproducibility of 0.90 is suggested as the minimum value necessary in order for items to form an adequate Guttman scale.[2]

Gamma correlation: Gamma is a measure of the degree of association between two sets of ordered categories. Gamma was especially appropriate for this study because of the numerous tied ranks involved in the research, where all persons in the same category of a variable had the same rank (tied ranks). Gamma was used for data of two types: ordinal data[3] and dichotomous data.[4] Because the whole population of the House

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[1] The coefficients were calculated using the following formula: CR = 1.00 - e/r, where CR = coefficient of reproducibility, e = errors, and r = total number of responses.

[2] Anderson, et. al., Legislative Roll-Calls Analysis, p. 112.

[3] Ordinal data are data rank-ordered on a characteristic or property according to the numbers that they carry. These numbers indicate "greater than" or "less than" relationships among the data, but do not specify "how much" difference exists between them. For example, in this study the scale scores are ordinal data (see Tables 5 and 6), indicating how liberal (or conservative) each House member was, but they do not reveal whether the group of congressmen in 1968 who had scale scores of 19 were "closer" to those who had scores of 18 or those at 20, and so on for all of the scale score groups in both years.

[4] Dichotomous data are those data divided into two categories. The

for both years was included in this study (with the minor exceptions mentioned previously) instead of just a sample of the House members, tests of statistical significance for the gammas obtained were not run. Generally, a gamma of between .000- |.300| is considered low, between |.301| - |.600| medium, and between |.601| - |1.000| high.[1]

Pearson's contingency coefficient (C): Because the whole population of the House was included in this study instead of just a sample, the chi-square technique was not used. But another measure of association based on chi-square was employed--Pearson's contingency coefficient (C). In order to be used, the contingency coefficient had to be modified:

> Although the upper limit [of C] increases as the number of rows and columns increases, this upper limit is always less than one. For this reason, C is somewhat more difficult to interpret than the other measures unless a correction is introduced by dividing by the maximum value of C for the particular numbers of rows and columns.[2]

Thus C' (the corrected value for the contingency coefficient) is calculated by dividing the original contingency coefficient value obtained by the maximum value of C.[3] The contingency coefficient was used for

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two dichotomous variables used in this study were party and committee membership.

[1]For more details about gamma see John H. Mueller, Karl F. Schuessler, and Herbert L. Costner, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology (2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), pp. 279-90.

[2]Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 230.

[3]The formula for the maximum value of C is as follows: $C_{max} = \sqrt{\frac{t-1}{t}}$, where Cmax = the maximum value of C and t = the number of cells for rows or columns (whichever is the larger number).

nominal data.[1] No tests of statistical significance were run for the contingency coefficients obtained, just as was the case for the gammas.

The results of the study pertaining to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter I will be presented in the next two chapters. These results, along with the appropriate tables and gamma and contingency coefficient statistics, were calculated using a modified version of the NUCROS (computer) program.[2]

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[1]Nominal data are numbers used merely for identification purposes and do not have a number meaning. They cannot be ordered or added at all but act as labels for different groups. For example, in this study the regions were assigned numbers as follows: Northeast, 1; South, 2; North Central, 3; West, 4. Just because the West had a larger number (4) than did the Northeast (1) did not mean that the Northeast was valued less than the West. The numbers were used to classify the states according to what region each one belonged to.

[2]For more details on the NUCROS program see Kenneth Janda, Data Processing: Applications to Political Research (2nd ed.; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 161-67.

CHAPTER III

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP, POLITICAL PARTY, AND VOTING

Structural Features

In Chapter I various hypotheses were proposed for close examination. In this and the next chapter the findings of this study as related to these hypotheses will be presented. The two independent variables falling under the category of structural features, committee membership and political party, were investigated to determine whether they were related to the dependent variable, voting outcome. Structural features, as mentioned in Chapter I, are those properties within the governmental system which may have an effect on legislative voting on national security issues. The results of the analysis of the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable will be presented in tables, along with the particular gamma values obtained.

Committee membership and voting: One of the two structural feature variables used in this study was committee membership. As mentioned previously, the committees selected for analysis in this paper were the House Armed Services committee and the Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee. The hypothesis proposed was that committee members tended to be more pro-defense than non-committee members. It was felt that the committee members, who were particularly concerned with defense issues, would develop more favorable attitudes toward defense needs and requests. Also, as was determined earlier

(Tables 12 and 13 in Chapter II), committee members had a greater than proportional constituency economic interest in defense (installations and plants) in their particular districts. Thus it was assumed that these two factors would make committee members more inclined to vote for defense-related proposals than non-committee members, since the committee members might develop a special outlook on defense matters because of their greater access to information and also since it may be in their political interests to vote to get and keep economic benefits for their respective constituencies.

The results obtained for this relationship (committee membership and voting) are shown in Tables 14 and 15. There was very little relationship between the variables in both years. The gamma for Table 14 is .271 while for Table 15 the gamma is only .158. Although the association is positive, the gammas are too low to be considered meaningful. Furthermore, the value of gamma decreased from 1961 to 1968 despite the fact that the committee members' interests in defense (installations and plants) had increased over the same period.[1] There was a tendency though for extreme hawks (type 0) and moderates (type 2 in 1961 and type 3 in 1968) to be somewhat overrepresented and the doves (types 3 and 4 in 1961 and types 4 and 5 in 1968) to be underrepresented on the three committees (combined) for both years.

Political party and voting: One notable political scientist has written that, ". . ., party continues to be more closely associated with

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[1] See Tables 12 and 13 in Chapter II.

TABLE 14.--Committee Membership and Voting, by Number and Percentage,[a] House, 1961

Scale Type[b] (1)	Committee Members[c]		Non-Committee Members	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	13	25.0	80	20.9
1	8	15.4	66	17.3
2	25	48.1	65	17.0
3	2	3.8	82	21.5
4	4	7.7	89	23.3
Total	52	100.0	382	100.0

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

[c]The committee members were those representatives who served on one of these committees in 1961: the House Armed Services committee and the Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee.

congressional voting behavior than any other discernible factor."[1] This statement was confirmed by the studies of Mitchell, Bozik, and Cobb (see Chapter I). Whether this proposition also holds true for the roll call votes selected for examination in this paper will be determined after studying all of the results obtained.

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[1]Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LXIX, No. 1 (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 34. (Hereinafter referred to as Party and Constituency.)

TABLE 15.--Committee Membership and Voting, by Number and Percentage,[a] House, 1968

Scale Type[b] (1)	Committee Members[c]		Non-Committee Members	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	13	22.8	45	12.1
1	8	14.0	62	16.6
2	8	14.0	63	16.9
3	15	26.3	80	21.4
4	9	15.8	91	24.4
5	4	7.0	32	8.6
Total	57	99.9	373	100.0

[a]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

[c]The committee members were those representatives who served on one of these committees in 1968: the House Armed Services committee and the Defense Appropriations and the Military Construction Appropriations subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee.

As far as political party and voting are concerned, some interesting findings appear when the legislators are cross classified according to these two variables. This was done to test the hypothesis that Democrats tended to be more pro-defense than Republicans. This hypothesis was proposed because some of the previous studies indicated that this had been the trend (see Chapter I).[1] This hypothesis is clearly refuted by

[1]This includes the study done by Samuel Huntington (Common Defense, pp. 251-59).

the data for both of the years studied. Table 16 shows the results for 1961.[1] For this year the Democratic House members tend to be located near the liberal end of the scale (Column 3) while the Republicans tend to be near the conservative end (Column 5). Table 17 shows the distribution for 1968.[2] The trend in 1961 also continued to hold in 1968, with only 6 Republicans falling the the two most liberal scale types (Column 4). Thus the Republicans tended to be more pro-defense than the Democrats (at least in 1961 and 1968). Russett also found this to be true in his study.

The gammas obtained were - .595 for Table 16 and - .538 for Table 17, making the results very meaningful. Several reasons can be offered as to why the Democrats tended to be liberal instead of conservative on national security issues. One reason could be that many of the roll calls used in this study were votes on foreign aid, which many Democrats (outside of the South) tend to support. Another reason could be what Russett calls "the politics of opposition."[3] For example, during the 1950's the Democrats in Congress usually tried to increase the yearly defense budgets proposed by the Eisenhower Administration. Defense also was one of the major issues raised by the Democrats during the 1960 Presidential campaign (the "missile gap"). Thus, "'Preparedness' was a good vote-getting issue throughout the 1950's and most of the 1960's."[4]

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[1] The scale types are the same ones used in Table 5, Chapter II.

[2] The scale types are the same ones used in Table 6, Chapter II.

[3] Russett, Price, p. 86.

[4] Ibid.

TABLE 16.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage,[a] House, 1961

Scale Type[b] (1)	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	31	11.9	62	35.8
1	41	15.7	33	19.1
2	36	13.8	54	31.2
3	64	24.5	20	11.6
4	89	34.1	4	2.3
Total	261	100.0	173	100.0

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

Still another reason might be that the Democrats have usually supported governmental spending programs to try to solve some of the problems at home and abroad while the Republicans have tended to favor economy in government.

Still another factor which must be considered in analyzing the voting in 1968 is the Vietnam war. Although there were no important roll call votes taken on the Vietnam issue in 1968, some congressmen had begun to question U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Opposition to the war grew during the year, particularly within the ranks of the Democratic party. This questioning of American foreign policy by members of the majority party may be explained by Lubell's "political solar system" theory:

TABLE 17.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage,[a] House, 1968

Scale Type[b] (1)	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	30	12.3	28	15.1
1	21	8.6	49	26.3
2	27	11.1	44	23.7
3	36	14.8	59	31.7
4	96	39.3	4	2.2
5	34	13.9	2	1.1
Total	244	100.0	186	100.1

[a]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

> Our political solar system, . . ., has been characterized not by two equally competing suns, but by a sun and a moon. It is within the majority party that the issues of any particular period are fought out; while the minority party shines in reflected radiance of the heat thus generated.[1]

The roll calls examined in this study reflect the controversy over national security issues present in 1968 which was not the case for 1961.[2] The dovish congressmen, largely because of the controversy over the

[1]Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 200.

[2]See the sections in Chapter II concerned with the roll calls in 1961 and 1968.

Vietnam war, were tending to question more and more of the nation's defense and foreign policies which heretofore had been considered sacrosanct.

To further examine the relationship between political party and voting, the technique of subclassification was used to hold the region variable constant. The results are shown in Tables 18 and 19. The gamma values for the various sub-tables are as follows: Table 18a, - .953; Table 18b, - .506; Table 18c, - .880; Table 18d, - .823; Table 19a, - .933; Table 19b, - .291; Table 19c, - .829; Table 19d, 0 .853. Thus the relationship between political party and voting was very strong in all regions of the country except the South for both years. The South will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

There are also some other interesting findings which appear in the tables. Of the thirty-one extreme hawks (type 0) for the Democrats in 1961 (Table 16, Column 2), all but one came from the South (Table 18b, Column 2). The same situation occurred in 1968, with all but two of the extreme Democratic hawks (type 0) coming from the South (Table 17, Column 2 and Table 19b, Column 2). Even most of the Democrats placed in scale type 1 for both years came from the South. On the other extreme, over half of the Democratic representatives from the Northeastern and the North Central states were extreme doves (type 4) in 1961 (Table 18a, Column 3 and Table 18c, Column 3). In 1968 over one half of the Democratic representatives from the Northeastern (Table 19a, Column 3), the North Central (Table 19c, Column 3), and the Western (Table 19d, Column 3) states were placed in the two most liberal categories (types 4 and 5). These results agree with those of Russett's, who found that Northern Democratic senators tended to be much less hawkish than Southern Democratic

TABLE 18a.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Northeast, 1961

Scale Type[a] (1)	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	0	00.0	10	16.9
1	0	00.0	7	11.9
2	19	33.9	39	66.1
3	2	3.6	2	3.4
4	35	62.5	1	1.7
Total	56	100.0	59	100.0

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

senators.

In contrast the Republican House members tended to be either moderates or hawks in both 1961 and 1968. In 1961 more than one half of the Republican moderates (type 2) came from the Northeastern states (Table 16, Column 4 and Table 18a, Column 4), and over one half of the extreme Republican hawks (type 0) came from the North Central states (Table 18c, Column 4).[1] Exactly one half of the extreme Republican hawks (type 0) came from the North Central states in 1968 (Table 17, Column 4 and Table 19c, Column 4), with the next largest group of extreme Republican hawks coming from the South (Table 19b, Column 4). On the other hand, one half of the Republican doves (types 4 and 5) came from the Northeast

[1]It should be pointed out that there were only ten Republican congressmen from the South in 1961 in this study.

TABLE 18b.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--South, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	30	24.8	5	50.0
1	33	27.3	3	30.0
2	11	9.1	1	10.0
3	31	25.6	1	10.0
4	16	13.2	0	00.0
Total	121	100.0	10	100.0

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

(Table 19a, Column 4).

TABLE 18c.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--North Central, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	0	00.0	38	48.7
1	6	11.8	17	21.8
2	3	5.9	7	9.0
3	15	29.4	14	17.9
4	27	52.9	2	2.6
Total	51	100.0	78	100.0

[a] The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

TABLE 18d.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--West, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	1	3.0	9	34.6
1	2	6.1	6	23.1
2	3	9.1	7	26.9
3	16	48.5	3	11.5
4	11	33.3	1	3.8
Total	33	100.0	26	99.9

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

TABLE 19a.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Northeast, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	0	00.0	2	4.7
1	0	00.0	1	2.3
2	1	1.6	14	32.6
3	7	11.1	23	53.5
4	35	55.6	2	4.7
5	20	31.7	1	2.3
Total	63	100.0	43	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

TABLE 19b.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--South, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	28	28.0	9	27.3
1	18	18.0	16	48.5
2	19	19.0	4	12.1
3	18	18.0	2	6.1
4	15	15.0	2	6.1
5	2	2.0	0	00.0
Total	100	100.0	33	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

TABLE 19c.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--North Central, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	1	2.3	14	17.5
1	3	6.8	27	33.7
2	3	6.8	15	18.8
3	2	4.5	23	28.8
4	27	61.4	0	00.0
5	8	18.2	1	1.3
Total	44	100.0	80	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

TABLE 19d.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--West, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	1	2.7	3	10.0
1	0	00.0	5	16.7
2	4	10.8	11	36.7
3	9	24.3	11	36.7
4	19	51.4	0	00.0
5	4	10.8	0	00.0
Total	37	100.0	30	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

Holding the variable committee membership constant, further results were obtained in investigating the relationship between party and voting, as shown in Tables 20 and 21. The gammas for the various sub-tables are as follows: Table 20a, - .353; Table 20b, - .621; Table 21a, - .441; Table 21b, - .556. Thus in both years the relationship between political party and voting was stronger among non-committee members (Tables 20b and 21b) than committee members (Tables 20a and 21a).

TABLE 20a.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Committee Members, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	5	17.2	8	34.8
1	4	13.8	4	17.4
2	16	55.2	9	39.1
3	0	00.0	2	8.7
4	4	13.8	0	00.0
Total	29	100.0	23	100.0

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

Comparing the voting distribution of committee and non-committee members reveals that the hawkish and moderate representatives tended to be overrepresented (in percentage) on the various committees analyzed. This was true for both parties in both years, with some exceptions. For the Democrats in 1961 the extreme hawks (type 0) and the moderates (type 2) were overrepresented on the committees while the doves were

TABLE 20b.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Non-Committee Members, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	26	11.2	54	36.0
1	37	15.9	29	19.3
2	20	8.6	45	30.0
3	64	27.6	18	12.0
4	85	36.6	4	2.7
Total	232	99.9	150	100.0

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

underrepresented (Table 16, Column 3; Table 20a, Column 3; Table 20b, Column 3). In fact, more than 85 percent of the Democratic committee members were placed in scale types 0-2 in 1961 (Table 20a, Column 3), which is in sharp contrast to the non-committee membership distribution (Table 20b, Column 3). Similar results were obtained for 1968, with the Democratic committee members tending to be more heavily concentrated in the moderate and hawkish parts of the scale (Table 21a, Column 3) compared with the general (Table 17, Column 3) and the non-committee membership (Table 21b, Column 3) distributions. Thus overall Democratic committee members tended to be more hawkish than their other fellow Democrats.

As far as the Republicans were concerned, their committee members tended to be overrepresented in the moderate (type 2) category and

TABLE 21a.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Committee Members, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	6	18.2	7	29.2
1	4	12.1	4	16.7
2	2	6.1	6	25.0
3	9	27.3	6	25.0
4	9	27.3	0	00.0
5	3	9.1	1	4.2
Total	33	100.1	24	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

underrepresented in the more dovish (types 3 and 4) categories (Table 20a, Column 5) compared to the general (Table 16, Column 5) and the non-committee membership (Table 20b, Column 5) distributions in 1961. The situation was somewhat different in 1968, with the more hawkish representatives (types 0 and 1) being overrepresented (Table 17, Column 5; Table 21a, Column 5; Table 21b, Column 5). Also, the one Republican dove (type 5) serving on one of the committees in 1968 (Table 21a, Columns 4 and 5) gave the Republican doves more representation (in percentage terms) on these committees than was the case in the general (Table 17, Column 5) and non-committee (Table 21b, Column 5) membership distributions. Thus no general overall pattern emerges for the Republican committee members for these two years.

TABLE 21b.--Political Party and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Non-Committee Members, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Democrats		Republicans	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	24	11.4	21	13.0
1	17	8.1	45	27.8
2	25	11.8	38	23.5
3	27	12.8	53	32.7
4	87	41.2	4	2.5
5	31	14.7	1	0.6
Total	211	100.0	162	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

Therefore of the two structural variables, political party was more closely related to the voting behavior on defense issues than was committee membership. Although committee members as a whole tended to be slightly more supportive of defense measures (Table 16, Columns 3 and 5; Table 17, Columns 3 and 5; Table 20a, Columns 3 and 5; Table 21a, Columns 3 and 5), party was more influential in determining voting behavior on national security legislation.

Summary

The findings in this chapter show that the relationship between committee membership and voting, although not statistically meaningful, pointed in the predicted direction. Thus, committee members tended to be

slightly more favorably inclined toward national security bills than non-committee members. Also, the predicted relationship between political party and voting was incorrect. The results indicate that the Republicans, not the Democrats, tended to be more pro-defense, as the term was defined in this study. However, political party affiliation was a better determinant of voting behavior than was committee membership.

CHAPTER IV

REGION, CONSTITUENCY ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND VOTING

External Influences

In the previous chapter it was determined that the structural variable party was closely related to voting whereas committee membership was not. In this chapter the two external influence variables, region and constituency economic interests, will be considered to determine if they were related to the dependent variable, voting outcome. External influences, mentioned previously in Chapter I, are outside reference points which may influence legislative voting on national security issues, since they are a part of the legislators' local environments. Just as in the previous chapter, the results of the analysis of the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable will be presented in tables, along with either the gamma or the contingency coefficient values obtained, whichever is the appropriate statistic.[1]

Region and voting: The external influence variable region includes stable traditional attitudes which are based on regional subcultures. How much these regional values and beliefs affected the voting on national security issues is of special concern here. As mentioned

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[1]The appropriate statistic was determined according to certain criteria, which are mentioned in the sections on gamma correlation and Pearson's contingency coefficient in Chapter II.

in Chapter II, four regions were used in this study: Northeast, South, North Central, and West. When the legislators are cross classified according to the variables of region and voting outcome, some interesting findings appear. Tables 22 and 23 show the voting patterns for each of the regions in 1961 and 1968 respectively. Table 22 has a corrected contingency coefficient of .541 while Table 23 has one of .496.[1]

TABLE 22.--Region and Voting, by Percentages,[a] House, 1961

Scale Type[b] (1)	Region			
	Northeast (2)	South (3)	North Central (4)	West (5)
0	8.7	26.7	29.5	16.9
1	6.1	27.5	17.8	13.6
2	50.4	9.2	7.8	16.9
3	3.5	24.4	22.5	32.2
4	31.3	12.2	22.5	20.3
Total	100.0 (n=115)	100.0 (n=131)	100.1 (n=129)	99.9 (n=59)

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

[1]The original coefficient of contingency values are .484 for Table 22 and .453 for Table 23 (The maximum value of C for a 5 by 5 table is .894 while for a 6 by 6 table it is .913). For more details on how the corrected contingency coefficients were calculated see the section on Pearson's contingency coefficient in Chapter II.

In 1961 the House members from the Northeast and the West tend to be located toward the liberal end of the scale (Table 22, Columns 2 and 5). However, Southern and North Central congressmen tend to be more evenly distributed along the scale (Table 22, Columns 3 and 4). The trend is just about the same in 1968, with the Northeastern and the Western representatives tending to be concentrated in the more liberal scale types (Table 23, Columns 2 and 5) while again the Southern and the North Central House members tend to be more evenly divided among the scale types (Table 23, Columns 3 and 4).

TABLE 23.--Region and Voting, by Percentages,[a] House, 1968

Scale Type[b] (1)	Region			
	Northeast (2)	South (3)	North Central (4)	West (5)
0	1.9	27.8	12.1	6.0
1	0.9	25.6	24.2	7.5
2	14.2	17.3	14.5	22.4
3	28.3	15.0	20.2	29.9
4	34.9	12.8	21.8	28.4
5	19.8	1.5	7.3	6.0
Total	100.0 (n=106)	100.0 (n=133)	100.1 (n=124)	100.2 (n=67)

[a]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

To more fully determine the effect of region on voting behavior, the party affiliation factor must be eliminated. Therefore, the party variable was held constant to investigate whether the voting patterns of Democrats and Republicans were similar or different in each section of the country. The results obtained are shown in Tables 24 and 25. The corrected contingency coefficients for the sub-tables are as follows: Table 24a, .555; Table 24b, .640; Table 25a, .515; Table 25b, .634. Thus the relationship between region and voting was stronger among the Democrats than the Republicans in both years.

TABLE 24a.--Region and Voting, by Percentages, House--Republicans, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Region			
	Northeast	South	North Central	West
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	16.9	50.0	48.7	34.6
1	11.9	30.0	21.8	23.1
2	66.1	10.0	9.0	26.9
3	3.4	10.0	17.9	11.5
4	1.7	00.0	2.6	3.8
Total	100.0 (n=59)	100.0 (n=10)	100.0 (n=78)	99.9 (n=26)

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

Comparing the above results with those obtained when region instead of party was held constant (Tables 18 and 19 in Chapter III), the tendency

seems to be that party was a more important determinant of voting behavior on national security issues than was region. The distribution of the scale scores within both parties for both years confirm this finding, with the Northeastern, the North Central, and the Western Republicans (Tables 24a and 25a, Columns 2, 4, and 5) generally tending to be more conservative than their Democratic counterparts (Tables 24b and 25b, Columns 2, 4, and 5). Only in the South, where most of the representatives were Democrats, does the trend fail to show. Thus the differences over the national security issues in this study tended to be due more to party rather than regional attitudes.

TABLE 24b.--Region and Voting, by Percentages, House--Democrats, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Region			
	Northeast	South	North Central	West
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	00.0	24.8	00.0	3.0
1	00.0	27.3	11.8	6.1
2	33.9	9.1	5.9	9.1
3	3.6	25.6	29.4	48.5
4	62.5	13.2	52.9	33.3
Total	100.0 (n=56)	100.0 (n=121)	100.0 (n=51)	100.0 (n=33)

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

TABLE 25a.--Region and Voting, by Percentages, House--Republican, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Region			
	Northeast	South	North Central	West
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	4.7	27.3	17.5	10.0
1	2.3	48.5	33.7	16.7
2	32.6	12.1	18.8	36.7
3	53.5	6.1	28.8	36.7
4	4.7	6.1	00.0	00.0
5	2.3	00.0	1.3	00.0
Total	100.1 (n=43)	100.1 (n=33)	100.1 (n=80)	100.1 (n=30)

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

Also, it was hypothesized that Southern representatives are more likely to vote for defense-related measures than are representatives from the other sections of the country. This hypothesis was proposed because Cobb and Russett had found Southern representatives and senators respectively to be very hawkish on national security measures. Therefore the scale score distributions of Southern and non-Southern representatives were compared with each other for both years, with the results shown in Tables 26 and 27. The gamma values are .235 for Table 26 and .538 for Table 27.[1] The data give some support to the hypothesis, with the

[1]Gamma instead of the contingency coefficient was used because the region variable was divided into two categories, thus making it dichotomous.

TABLE 25b.--Region and Voting, by Percentages, House--Democrats, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Region			
	Northeast	South	North Central	West
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	00.0	28.0	2.3	2.7
1	00.0	18.0	6.8	00.0
2	1.6	19.0	6.8	10.8
3	11.1	18.0	4.5	24.3
4	55.6	15.0	61.4	51.4
5	31.7	2.0	18.2	10.8
Total	100.0 (n=63)	100.0 (n=100)	100.0 (n=44)	100.0 (n=37)

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

Since most of the Southern representatives were Democrats in both years, the party variable was held constant to further compare the Southern with the non-Southern representatives. The results are shown in Tables 28 and 29. The gamma values for the sub-tables are as follows: Table 28a, .327; Table 28b, .682; Table 29a, .512; Table 29b, .832. The relationship was much stronger in the majority party in the South (the Democrats), which makes these findings more meaningful. This further supports the hypothesis that Southern representatives tended to be more hawkish on national security measures than representatives from the other sections of the country, with the trend increasing rather than decreasing.

TABLE 26.--Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage,[a] House--Southerners and Non-Southerners, 1961

Scale Type[b] (1)	Southerners		Non-Southerners	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	35	26.7	58	19.1
1	36	27.5	38	12.5
2	12	9.2	78	25.7
3	32	24.4	52	17.2
4	16	12.2	77	25.4
Total	131	100.0	303	99.9

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

However, despite the hawkishness of the Southern Democrats, the Republicans still tended to be the more conservative of the two parties on national security issues in both years (Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 in Chapter III).

TABLE 27.--Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage,[a] House--Southerners and Non-Southerners, 1968

Scale Type[b]	Southerners		Non-Southerners	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	37	27.8	21	7.1
1	34	25.6	36	12.1
2	23	17.3	48	16.2
3	20	15.0	75	25.3
4	17	12.8	83	27.9
5	2	1.5	34	11.4
Total	133	100.0	297	100.0

[a]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

TABLE 28a.--Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Southerners and Non-Southerners, Republicans, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Southerners		Non-Southerners	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	5	50.0	57	35.0
1	3	30.0	30	18.4
2	1	10.0	53	32.5
3	1	10.0	19	11.7
4	0	00.0	4	2.5
Total	10	100.0	163	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

TABLE 28b.--Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Southerners and Non-Southerners, Democrats, 1961

Scale Type[a]	Southerners		Non-Southerners	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	30	24.8	1	0.7
1	33	27.3	8	5.7
2	11	9.1	25	17.9
3	31	25.6	33	23.6
4	16	13.2	73	52.1
Total	121	100.0	140	100.0

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 4).

TABLE 29a.--Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Southerners and Non-Southerners, Republicans, 1968

Scale Type[a] (1)	Southerners		Non-Southerners	
	Number (2)	Percentage (3)	Number (4)	Percentage (5)
0	9	27.3	19	12.4
1	16	48.5	33	21.6
2	4	12.1	40	26.1
3	2	6.1	57	37.3
4	2	6.1	2	1.3
5	0	00.0	2	1.3
Total	33	100.1	153	100.0

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

TABLE 29b.--Region and Voting, by Number and Percentage, House--Southerners and Non-Southerners, Democrats, 1968

Scale Type[a]	Southerners		Non-Southerners	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
0	28	28.0	2	1.4
1	18	18.0	3	2.1
2	19	19.0	8	5.6
3	18	18.0	18	12.5
4	15	15.0	81	56.3
5	2	2.0	32	22.2
Total	100	100.0	144	100.1

[a]The scale types go from the most conservative (type 0) to the most liberal (type 5).

Constituency economic interests and voting: In the recent debate over the defense budget, the phrase "military-industrial complex" has often been used to describe a supposedly powerful group which purportedly has had much influence in shaping government defense policies. This phrase was made famous by former President Eisenhower in his Farewell Address to the nation, in which he warned against this "combination" (see Chapter I). To fully determine how much influence the "complex" has had on governmental defense policies is far beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, certain propositions can be tested using the data included in this paper. Specifically, the relationships between the constituency economic interests (installations and plants) and congressional voting behavior will be analyzed to determine whether the patterns of allocation affected the voting on defense-related legislation.

As mentioned in Chapter II, constituency economic interests were defined in this study as consisting of those economic benefits in an area derived from defense activities. These interests, measured in this study by the number of major military installations and private defense plants located in each of the congressional districts, vary in amount from one district to the next. Despite various limitations,[1] the data used (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Chapter II) can reveal a little about whether defense allocation patterns were correlated with congressional voting behavior on national security issues. Accordingly, these two

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[1]The limitations are mentioned in the section on installations and plant data in Chapter II.

hypotheses were proposed.

1. The more military installations a congressional district has, the more hawkish its representative will be.

2. The more defense contracts a congressional district receives, the more likely its representative will be to vote for defense-related programs.

For these hypotheses it was assumed that a congressman would vote to get and retain direct economic benefits for his constituents. Thus if one congressman's district received more defense funds than another's, the first congressman should theoretically have a smaller scale score in this study than the second one.

The results obtained are shown in Tables 30, 31, 32, and 33. The gammas for these tables are as follows: Table 30, .082; Table 31, .042; Table 32, -.129; Table 33, -.240. Therefore the two proposed hypotheses are clearly refuted, thus agreeing with the findings of Mitchell, Bozik, and Cobb. These tables reveal some very interesting patterns. In 1961 the most liberal category (type 4), as might be expected, has a higher percentage of those districts with no military installations in it than any other category (Table 30, Column 2). But surprisingly, the most conservative category (type 0) has the lowest percentage in Column 5, which contains the districts with 3 or more military installations (Table 30, Column 5). There were similar trends in 1968, with the more liberal congressmen again having a higher percentage of those districts containing 3 or more military installations than do the more conservative congressmen (Table 31, Column 5). These results do not verify Russett's conclusion that expenditures for military installations promote hawkish

TABLE 30.--Military Installations and Voting, by Percentages,[a] House, 1961

Scale Type[b] (1)	Number of Installations			
	None (2)	1 (3)	2 (4)	3 or More (5)
4	29.1	15.7	18.5	15.5
3	16.6	25.6	11.1	21.4
2	17.7	17.4	22.2	31.0
1	17.1	17.4	14.8	17.9
0	19.4	24.0	33.3	14.3
Total	99.9 (n=175)	100.1 (n=121)	99.9 (n=54)	100.1 (n=84)

[a] The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b] The scale types go from the most liberal (type 4) to the most conservative (type 0).

attitudes.[1]

There is one general overall pattern for the distributions of the defense plants (Tables 32 and 33).[2] In both 1961 and 1968 defense plants tended to be more concentrated in the districts of liberal rather than conservative congressmen. This may have occurred because of an urban-rural factor. The liberals might generally tend to represent urban

[1] See the section on Russett's study in Chapter I.

[2] It was assumed by the writer that more defense contracts (in a district) would result in more plants in which some defense work was done.

TABLE 31.--Military Installations and Voting, by Percentages,[a] House, 1968

Scale Type[b] (1)	Number of Installations			
	None (2)	1 (3)	2 (4)	3 or More (5)
5	13.4	3.0	5.0	4.4
4	19.9	26.7	26.7	25.0
3	20.9	24.8	16.7	26.5
2	15.4	16.8	20.0	16.2
1	18.4	11.9	15.0	17.6
0	11.9	16.8	16.7	10.3
Total	99.9 (n=201)	100.0 (n=101)	100.1 (n=60)	100.0 (n=68)

[a]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most liberal (type 5) to the most conservative (type 0).

industrial centers while the conservatives might generally tend to come from the rural areas of the country, their districts thus lacking the facilities needed to attract defense work. Also, the negative gamma values for both tables, though very low, are indications that the number of defense plants tended to be negatively related to voting on defense issues. This result may in part be due to the large number of foreign aid votes used in this study, which would further account for the possible urban-rural pattern involved.

Thus the distribution of defense funds apparently had had no effect on congressional voting behavior on the national security issues

TABLE 32.--Defense Plants and Voting, by Percentages,[a] House, 1961

Scale Type[b] (1)	Number of Plants None (2)	1 (3)	2 (4)	3 or More (5)
4	21.3	14.7	24.4	28.8
3	20.0	15.8	26.8	17.8
2	12.0	29.5	26.8	32.9
1	23.1	14.7	9.8	5.5
0	23.6	25.3	12.2	15.1
Total	100.0 (n=225)	100.0 (n=95)	100.0 (n=41)	100.1 (n=73)

[a]The 1961 percentages were derived using only 434 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most liberal (type 4) to the most conservative (type 0).

included in this study. The supposed influence of the "military-industrial complex" on congressmen did not appear in any form in this limited analysis.

Summary

The analysis of data in this chapter shows that only one of the proposed hypotheses pertaining to the external influence variables was confirmed, and this only slightly so. The results indicate that,

1. Southerners tended to be more pro-defense in their voting on defense-related legislation than were representatives from the other sections of the country.

2. The distribution of military installations was not related to congressional voting on national security bills at all.

TABLE 33.--Defense Plants and Voting, by Percentages,[a] House, 1968

Scale Type[b] (1)	Number of Plants None (2)	1 (3)	2 (4)	3 or More (5)
5	6.4	9.5	8.5	12.2
4	20.1	24.8	34.0	23.0
3	15.7	24.8	23.4	35.1
2	17.6	15.2	14.9	16.2
1	20.6	18.1	12.8	4.1
0	19.6	7.6	6.4	9.5
Total	100.0 (n=204)	100.0 (n=105)	100.0 (n=47)	100.0 (n=74)

[a]The 1968 percentages were derived using only 430 of the House members.

[b]The scale types go from the most liberal (type 5) to the most conservative (type 0).

3. The distribution of defense contracts also was not related to congressional voting on national security issues at all.

Furthermore, although the region variable was related to the voting, it was not as meaningful as the party variable was in affecting voting behavior on national security issues.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Hypotheses

This research has been conducted to find out more about legislative behavior in an important area of public policy--national security affairs. This was done by testing certain hypotheses through the use of roll call analysis. These hypotheses, presented in Chapter I, were proposed using certain variables which had been examined previously in the four studies mentioned in Chapter I. The results of this study will be related to the proposed hypotheses and also to the four studies to determine whether the writer's findings agree or disagree with previous conclusions. The writer will also speculate about these findings in the last part of this chapter.

The committee membership hypothesis: It was hypothesized that committee members are more likely to vote for defense-related legislation than are non-committee members. The results show that this hypothesis is not supported by the data. Although the committee members as a whole tended to be slightly more pro-defense than non-committee members, they (the members) usually tended to vote along party lines on national security roll calls.

As far as the other studies were concerned, only Mitchell and Bozik used the committee membership variable in their studies. They both concluded that although the committee members as a whole tended to

be slightly more supportive of national security measures, they still tended to divide along party lines in their voting. The results of this study support the conclusion reached by both Mitchell and Bozik that there was no consensus on defense-related matters in the committees analyzed.

The writer's findings in this area are subject to various limitations. First of all, the committee members studied were those representatives who served either on the House Armed Services committee or on one of the two relevant subcommittees of the House Appropriations committee, which handle domestic military programs. But many of the roll call votes used were not in the domestic defense category but were instead concerned with American foreign policy. Thus there was the possibility that some committee members voted pro-defense on roll calls in one category and anti-defense on roll calls in another. Secondly, the writer did not include two House committees, the House Foreign Affairs committee and the House Science and Astronautics committee, which are also concerned with national security matters. Third, the writer did not analyze committee hearings, where important issues were probably settled before the whole House voted on the various proposals. Finally, the military backgrounds of committee and non-committee members were not included in this study. This variable could also have been related to legislative voting behavior on national security matters, indicating whether or not there was a pro-military bias present, especially on the committees.

The political party hypothesis: As far as the political parties and voting behavior were concerned, it was hypothesized that Democrats are more likely to be pro-defense than are Republicans. This hypothesis

is clearly refuted by the data. The Republicans tended to be more pro-defense than the Democrats in both of the years studied. Furthermore, of the four independent variables tested in this study political party was the most important determinant of voting behavior on national security legislation in both 1961 and 1968. This adds further support to Turner's contention that, "Party pressure seems to be more effective than any other pressure on congressional voting, . . ."[1]

In the other four studies, the writers came to different conclusions about the political parties and their voting on defense issues. Mitchell and Bozik found the Democrats to be more pro-defense while Cobb and Russett found the Republicans to be more hawkish. There may be two reasons why Mitchell and Bozik obtained different results than did Cobb, Russett, and this writer. First of all, Mitchell and Bozik included many roll call votes from the 1950's in their studies, whereas Cobb, Russett, and this writer used only roll call votes from the 1960's. The pattern in the 1950's seemed to be that the Democrats were more pro-defense than the Republicans on national security matters.[2] In fact, of the ten roll call votes Bozik used in his study to compute a pro-defense percentage for each party, seven were from the 1950's, which could help explain his results.[3] Second, the definitions of what were pro-defense and anti-defense votes on various types of legislation may have differed in each study. For example, Mitchell defined a vote as

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[1]Turner, Party and Constituency, p. 23.

[2]Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 251-59.

[3]Bozik, "Congressional Action," n. 1, p. 41.

being pro-defense if it was ". . . cast so as to favor an increase in the magnitude of defense here or abroad, . . ."[1] But the writer considered voting for spending programs abroad, like foreign aid, to be anti-defense or liberal (see Chapter II), which may account for why the writer concluded the the Republicans rather than the Democrats tended to be more pro-defense. However, the conclusion reached by Mitchell, Bozk, and Cobb that political party was the most important determinant of voting behavior on national security issues is supported by the data of this study.

One serious limitation of the writer's analysis of the political party variable was again the lack of votes on domestic defense measures, which would have indicated how consistent the voting patterns were for both parties on various defense-related issues. Another limitation was the lack of a study of informal party activities, such as party caucuses and the meetings of party leaders with other high government officials, where various defense and other legislative issues may have been resolved.

The region hypothesis: With regards to region and voting patterns, it was hypothesized that Southerners are more likely to vote for defense-related measures than are representatives from the other sections of the country. The data of this study somewhat support this hypothesis and also show that region was related to the voting on national security issues, though not as much as political party was.

In the other four studies, some evidence was included in each to indicate the hawkishness of Southerners on national security issues.

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[1] Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p.233.

Cobb found in his sutdy that Southern representatives were the most hawkish group in both political parties. In his research Russett found Southern senators to be very hawkish. Bozik, calculating the pro-defense voting percentages for each section, determined that the South had the highest overall sectional pro-defense voting percentage in his study.[1] Finally, Mitchell, after calculating the South's sectional deviation from the national party mean in her study, came to this conclusion about the South: "The most significant and strongly negative positions are found in opposition to international defense programs and measures."[2] This corresponds with the writer's assumptions about pro-defense (conservative) voting on foreign policy roll calls in Chapter II. Also, in all four studies region was found to be related to the voting on national security issues, just as the writer had found in his research.

In studying the region variable, the writer was again limited by the nature of the roll call votes included in the analysis. Not enough roll call votes on domestic defense measures were available to fully determine whether regional attitudes affected voting in all categories of national security legislation. Another limitation was that the urbanization variable was not used in this study. The urban-rural factor may account for some of the differences attributed to the region variable in this study.

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[1]Bozik, "Congressional Action," p. 49.

[2]Mitchell, "Legislative Decision-Making," p. 370.

The military installations and defense contracts hypotheses: To test the "military-industrial complex" concept, these two hypotheses were proposed:

1. The more military installations a congressional district has, the more hawkish its representative will be.

2. The more defense contracts a congressional district receives, the more likely its representative will be to vote for defense-related programs.

The results of this study refute these two hypotheses. The distribution of defense funds was not related to the voting on national security issues at all.

In the other four studies, the writers also found that defense spending within a constituency had very little (if any) correlation with the voting behavior of the legislators with one exception. Russett concluded that military spending for local defense bases was more highly correlated with defense voting in the Senate than was military spending for local prime contracts. However, the statistical methods he used in obtaining these results are very questionable. Instead of using the gamma statistic as this writer did (see Chapter II), Russett used such measures as rank-order correlation (tau) and level of significance in his research, which are for statistical studies of samples rather than whole populations.

As with the other hypotheses tested, the writer's findings about the "military-industrial complex" are somewhat limited by the kinds of roll calls used. As has been mentioned before, many foreign policy roll call votes were included in this study. The writer felt that these foreign policy votes might reveal possible relationships between the

patterns of allocation and the patterns of congressional voting behavior, because the same pressures which a constituency may put on its congressman to vote to get and retain defense funds would also influence his voting on foreign policy questions. In other words ". . ., pressures for cognitive consistency would be expected to make influence on [defense] appropriations voting go together with influence on foreign policy voting."[1] Also, as was mentioned previously, the urbanization variable was not examined in this study, which might reveal more about the relationship between the distribution of defense contracts and congressional voting behavior.

General Conclusions

The main purpose of this study has been to show how congressmen reacted to certain decisional situations in the field of national security affairs. To also indicate why they did so cannot be determined by an empirical analysis of votes alone. Nevertheless, the writer will offer some possible explanations for the results of this study.

The civilian control theory: First of all, the results of this study are inconclusive about the civilian control theory. This theory, mentioned at the beginning of Chapter I, states that both the executive and the legislative branches of the government maintain a control over the military. Theoretically, Congress controls the military, mainly through its "power of the purse." While this study has shown that the committee members were divided over national security issues and that the distribution of defense funds apparently was not related to voting behavior, the roll call votes used in this study were an indication of

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[1]Cobb, "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy," p. 362.

the noncontroversial nature of defense bills. In both of the years studied, defense appropriation and authorization bills were passed with little (if any) opposition in the House. Only particular parts of these bills were subjected to question and amendment. Thus the results obtained were based upon an analysis of roll call votes usually concerned with topics other than domestic defense measures. Therefore more research must be done, especially in the areas of the role of civilian Pentagon officials in the defense budget process and the informal congressional activities concerned with military requests, (see Chapter I), to more fully test the civilian control theory.

Democrats and Republicans: Second, there may be several reasons why the Democrats tended to be more pro-defense in the 1950's while the Republicans tended to be more hawkish in the 1960's. In the 1950's the Democrats had difficulties in opposing a Republican president who was a war hero, especially during a period of great tension between East and West. Consequently, the Democrats, to show their concern for the nation's defense, called for even larger defense budgets than did President Eisenhower. Furthermore, not many Democrats were elected from the Midwestern (North Central) states, where there has been a tradition of isolationism in foreign affairs in the past.

In the 1960's the Democrats were confronted with the "guns" versus "butter" issue. The Democrats under President Johnson were faced with either meeting domestic needs or honoring the United States' foreign commitments, particularly in Southeast Asia. Thus the Democrats had to choose between satisfying the demands of their urban supporters or their rural ones. President Johnson chose the "guns," thus postponing efforts

to meet domestic needs. But other Democrats opposed this policy, especially many Democrats from the urban Northeastern states who became very dovish on national security matters (see Tables 18a and 19a in Chapter III). In contrast, the Republicans faced no such dilemma when confronted with a choice between meeting urban or foreign needs, since their supporters tended not to come from the cities. Also, the famous "missile gap" issue raised by the Democrats during the 1960 Presidential campaign may have made the Republicans more determined than ever not to lost votes in the future on the defense preparedness issue.

Conservative coalition: Finally, the future trend in the voting on national security issues may be reflected in the results of this study. The data of this study show that Republicans and Southerners tended to be the most hawkish groups of all in the House of Representatives. Thus a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats in the House might be forming on national security votes, just as a similar alliance has existed on many domestic issues:

> But in these thirty years [1938-1968] a coalition, predominantly rural, of Republicans and southern Democrats in the House of Representatives blocked or whittled down most of the presidential proposals--except for a period of two years, 1965-1967, when, as a result of the Goldwater fiasco, enough northern Democrats were elected to create a short-lived but effective liberal majority in the House.[1]

Furthermore, on two roll call votes concerning troop withdrawal from Indochina taken in 1971, this same pattern also emerges, with mainly Republicans and Southern Democrats on one side and Northern Democrats

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[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, Power and Violence in America, Bantam Books (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1969), p. 221.

on the other.[1] Whether this is the trend on other roll call votes is a matter for further study.

Much more research needs to be done on the topic of congressional voting behavior on national security issues. Unlike the past, defense policies have become more controversial recently. All of the variables which may be related to the voting behavior on defense-related legislation, including those variables omitted from this study, should be further analyzed to determine the influence of each variable in this key policy area.

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[1] The two roll call votes are found in "House Vote on Withdrawal," New York Times, June 29, 1971, p. 33 and "CQ House Votes," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXIX (October 23, 1971), 2206-207. (RC 205. HR 8687)

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